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I. Abstract 
The goal of this study was to examine the extent to which insurance type, or 
method of care management, impact the appropriate delivery of health care.  Previous 
studies indicate a relationship between insurance type and patterns of consumption but do 
not directly link the incentives or disincentives inherent in each plan with trends in 
consumption of health care.  This study explores how different types of health insurance 
coverage affect the location, the degree, and the frequency of health care consumption in 
order to gain insight into which plans promote appropriate delivery and consumption of 
care.   
Patterns of health care consumption with various health care plans (HMO, PPO, 
POS, FFS, IPA, military insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid) and for those without 
insurance were examined using multivariate regressions on data from the 2006 National 
Health Interview Survey.  It was found that having insurance increases the probability of 
obtaining preventative care, as indicated by vaccinations, and decreases the probability of 
not being able to afford care.  Regarding the type of care consumed by individuals, 
results indicate that those with Medicare, Medicaid, and other government insurance 
frequent the ER and have surgery more often than those with Private insurance.  
Medicaid enrollees were found to frequent the ER 24.5 percent more often than the 
privately insured, and 22.4 percent more likely than the uninsured.  Medicaid enrollees 
also frequent the doctor’s office 57.1 percent more often than the privately insured, 
indicating an overall higher use of health care among individuals on Medicaid compared 
to the privately insured. 
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The impact of type of insurance on inappropriate care was also examined, as 
measured by use of Emergency Rooms (ER) or free clinics as the location of routine care, 
excessive use of specialist visits, and preventable hospitalizations for ambulatory care 
conditions.  Results indicate that the privately insured are the least likely to list the ER or 
a free clinic as their usual location of care and that there is little difference between the 
types of care received between insurance plans.  Among the privately insured, it was 
found that those with PPO or POS plans had more specialist visits relative to those with 
HMO or IPA plans and other government insurance. 
These findings have serious efficiency implications under health care reform.  In 
finding ways to halt rising health care expenditures and the emergency room crisis, a goal 
of reforms should be to limit unnecessary ER visits because they are at a higher cost to 
the system.  Insurance plans should be promoted which attempt to reduce costs and ER 
usage, and those plans which encourage excessive ER utilization should be reformed. 
 
II. Introduction 
 Investigating the relationship between health insurance and health care 
consumption is essential in furthering our understanding of the health care system.  To 
enable individuals to have access to quality and affordable care, we must find ways to 
slow the rise of health care expenditures.  This can be achieved by locating and reforming 
aspects of our current system which induce individuals to consume care inefficiently.  
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, United States health care expenditures 
reached $2.3 trillion, or $7,681 per person, in 2008.  This represents 16.2 percent of the 
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GDP and has been on the rise from 7.2 percent of the GDP in 1970, and 12.3 percent of 
the GDP in 1990.  The rising cost of health care is a major problem which the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act passed in March of 2010 tries to address.  Another 
main issue is a growing crisis in ER access.  Nationally, over the past ten years, ER 
utilization has increased by 26 percent while the number of ERs has decreased by 9 
percent (Kellerman, 2006).  This crisis may be due to low Medicaid and Medicare 
reimbursement rates.  These reforms are intended to solve the health care crisis stemming 
from high levels of uninsured individuals and soaring expenditures. 
The reforms signed into action by President Obama on March 23, 2010 increase 
the number of Americans on Medicaid, and mandates that employers offer insurance and 
that individuals have coverage.  This is a similar requirement to those enacted in the 
Massachusetts Reforms which were in effect by 2007.  These two plans diverge in their 
insurance reforms in that the federal reforms raise Medicaid reimbursement rates and 
prevent insurance companies from denying individuals based on pre-existing conditions 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010).  Requiring large employers to offer health insurance 
essentially increases the number of Americans on private insurance because most 
employer-based insurance is private.  The theoretical net result of these reforms is an 
increase in the number of insured Americans by putting more individuals under Medicaid 
and private insurance plans, but what are the implications of these reforms on health care 
consumption by patients?  This thesis intends to shed light on the answer to that question 
by examining how individuals currently under these plans consume care to probe the 
consumption patterns we could expect when these reforms are put into action.  Expanding 
4 
 
4 
Medicaid and private insurance magnifies any inefficiency inherent in these plans.  
Recognizing the flaws in the Medicaid and private insurance systems can enable us to 
address issues before they hinder any benefits the reforms may bring. 
In this thesis, I will first explain what characterizes each type of insurance.  
Building off of this understanding, we can then examine the economic theory behind 
health insurance and how it is believed to change how people consume health care.  Then 
we are equipped to discuss the theory of moral hazard and the literature exploring the 
relationships between health insurance, health outcomes, and patterns of health care 
consumption.  Highlighting the incentives in each type of health care insurance and how 
they affect how patients consume care enables us to examine the level of efficiency or 
inefficiency induced by different policies.  Since there are varying incentives within each 
plan, efficiency implications and cost analyses will be discussed to frame the intended 
effects of policies within a plan.  Insurance companies try to structure their policies so 
that costs are reduced, but this theoretical goal is not always achieved.  These cost 
reduction measures are then analyzed with respect to both the consumer and the supplier 
sides of the market and assessed regarding their effectiveness.  Sources and motivations 
for inappropriate and inefficient care are extensively discussed, specifically regarding the 
overuse of Emergency Rooms (ERs) and free clinics.  The data section outlines the 
methodology of the study and the definitions of variables and controls.  With this 
background from the discussion of the theory behind health insurance, summary of 
previous literature and findings, and analysis techniques used here, we launch into the 
results and link them to efficiency implications for the system as a whole.  These 
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implications are then expanded to help guide, encourage, and question aspects of health 
care reform with the goal of ensuring increased access, affordability, and efficiency of 
health care provision and consumption.   
A. Defining Types of Insurance 
To analyze types of health care plans, it is first important to define the 
characteristics of health insurance which are found within each plan, as defined by the 
National Health Interview Survey writers.  For the purposes of this study, general 
insurance types were broken down into five groups.  The first group is the uninsured, 
which is defined as those individuals who do not list that they have any type of insurance 
coverage, or minimal Single-Service Plan which covers only one aspect of health care 
such as dental or prescription benefits, with no other type of insurance coverage.  
Individuals who qualify for Medicare are those over 65 years of age and select disabled 
individuals receiving federal coverage.  Medicaid is a joint federal-state program where 
the state administers coverage for low income and disabled individuals under the age of 
65.  Military insurance encompasses TRICARE plans, Veteran’s insurance, and 
CHAMP-VA plans, which cover the families of members of the armed forces.  Other 
government insurance includes the Indian Health Service, which is a federal program 
covering Native Americans, state –sponsored health plans, which are any type of state-
run coverage plans excluding Medicaid, or any other public health care plan which is not 
Medicare, Medicaid, or military insurance.  The distinction is made between these other 
government insurance plans and Medicare and Medicaid policies because they have very 
different coverage of services.  Private insurance includes those plans which are not 
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provided by federal or state programs, but does include Medi-Gap because it is purchased 
by the individual to supplement other public plans.  These private plans are typically 
purchased by the individual, the employer, or the union a person belongs to.  There are 
large variations between private insurance plans, so this category is divided into sub-
categories reflecting these differences.   
The first group of private insurance includes those with HMOs, or Health 
Maintenance Organizations, and IPAs, or Independent Practice Association.  These are 
plans which offer care to their enrollees for one fixed cost.  All patients pay a monthly or 
annual fee for any amount of care they receive, but they have to receive all care a 
specified locations.  IPAs, are similar to HMOs, but instead of linking patients to a 
hospital, they are linked to a variety of independent practices with different specialties so 
all care is covered.  They have the same incentives for patients to receive care solely at 
specified locations and therefore are grouped together in this study.  The second group of 
private insurance consists of PPOs, or Preferred Provider Organizations, and POS, or 
Point of Service plans.  PPOs are another type of managed care, but unlike HMOs, they 
offer financial incentives for their enrollees to pick doctors from a preferred list, but are 
allowed to go out of network for care, if they pay a higher price.  POS plans also allow 
for out of network coverage, and like PPOs, offer financial incentives for patients to stay 
within the network for care.  These two plans are similar in structure and incentives and 
are grouped together in regressions.  The third group of private insurance is comprised of 
FFS, or Fee-For-Service, plans.  Here, the insurer covers part of the hospital bill after the 
service has been rendered and the individual pays the rest.  These FFS plans are the 
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private insurance option with the greatest freedom of choice of doctor and location of 
care for the patient.   
These distinctions between plans are important to highlight because differences in 
health care consumption, when other care-dependant variables are controlled for, indicate 
the effects of incentives and disincentives within each plan.  Recognizing that individuals 
are induced into specific patterns of consumption is an important implication of health 
care policy reform.  In determining which type of insurance to encourage or dissuade 
individuals from acquiring, understanding the implications inherent within each plan 
allows for a more encompassing perspective on health care policy.   
 
III. Theory and Literature Review 
 In studying the relationship between insurance coverage and the health and health 
care use of individuals, it is important to understand the theory behind insurance and 
health care consumption.   One main topic concerning the theory behind insurance and 
health care use is moral hazard, or the induced consumption of health care due to over 
coverage by insurance.  This discussion of moral hazard will be followed by a review of 
the literature regarding the relationship between insurance and health care use and the 
demand of insurance.   These results will then be explained through an analysis of the 
characteristics of different insurance plans and how they induce people to consume care 
differently, and influence doctors to provide care differently immediately and in the long 
term.  All of these demand side issues are rooted in the idea that there is asymmetric 
information between the consumer of health care and health care professionals and the 
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insurance providers.  Another level of uncertainty resides on the supply side, between 
physicians and what is appropriate care, and between insurers and patients, as health care 
expenditures are attempted to be lowered. 
A.  Theory of Moral Hazard 
With the acquisition of health insurance, the consumption of health care increases 
because insurance policies decrease the price of care for an individual.  Consumption 
above the necessary level of care, as seen in Graph 1, is the inefficiency referred to as 
moral hazard.  Graph 1 depicts the dead weight loss from moral hazard with insurance.  
The shaded portion represents the inefficiency of the market involving moral hazard, 
assuming no co-pay or deductible.   Increasing the level of coinsurance or lowering the 
copayment paid by the consumer moves the individual along the demand curve, changing 
the quantity of care consumed.  The patient consumes more health care because, from 
their perspective, they face a lower price.  The demand curve is theoretically equal to the 
marginal benefits for the individual at any quantity and price of health care.  Curve D2 
represents the demand of an insured individual.  Each point on the line represents the 
balance where the benefits of care equal the patient’s willingness and ability to pay for 
that quantity of care.  This balance is unique for each individual because the willingness 
and ability to pay varies over time and from person to person.  Changing the copayment 
also changes the individual’s willingness and ability to pay, as shown by the sliding 
downwards along the demand curve with insurance (D2).  This slide down the curve from 
the ideal quantity of health care consumption, X1, creates more and more waste in the 
market because the marginal social cost of health care consumption is greater than the 
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marginal social benefit.  At the point where coinsurance is zero, X2, the price of care is 
zero for the patient; at this point individuals consume the greatest amount of health care 
and also generate the greatest amount of inefficiency.   
 
Graph 1.  Moral hazard causes a shift along the demand curve creating DWL, or 
inefficiency because a wasteful amount of health care is demanded. 
 
 The differences in the balance between the marginal benefits and costs are 
represented by the slope of the demand curve, or the elasticity of demand for health care.  
If the demand curve has a steep slope (D1), or is inelastic, the price of care could change 
dramatically while only inducing a small change in the quantity of care consumed.  
Conversely, if the demand curve is elastic (D2), a small change in price has a dramatic 
effect on the quantity of care consumed.  The elasticity of demand also determines the 
size of the DWL, along with the level of the co-pay.  An individual with an inelastic 
demand for health care will have a smaller amount of DWL than one with a very elastic 
demand curve because even if the price of care is substantially lowered, they will not 
consume a much larger quantity of care. 
DWL  
MC = Price 
D2 
D1 
P 
X1 
Q 
X2 
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In other words, when insurance is purchased, the cost of health care decreases for 
the individual, causing a change in the quantity of health care demanded.  For the same 
market price as before, which represents true marginal costs, a patient can consume a 
greater amount of health care because the insurance policy is covering part of the price of 
the care, thereby lowering the cost for the patient.  At the new level of health care 
demand the marginal social costs of consuming health care outweigh the marginal social 
benefits, creating waste. 
It is hard to determine whether this increased consumption of health care due to 
the acquisition of insurance is actually inefficient because this increase may represent 
care which was needed, but not previously affordable.  This idea of under-consumption 
of care due to the inability of a patient to pay is also illustrated in Graph 2.  Since the 
demand curve is comprised of the patient’s willingness and ability to pay for care, if they 
do not have the ability to pay for necessary care, any increase in consumption of care up 
to the point where the marginal costs are equal to the marginal benefits is not moral 
hazard, but a movement towards appropriate consumption of care (Nyman, 2007).  It is 
difficult to determine whether this increase in consumption is inefficient or a correction 
from a previous lack of access to necessary health care and is assessed in this study by 
the appropriateness of care measures.  Those cases where an increase in consumption of 
care in the short run leads to fewer hospitalizations for ambulatory care conditions (those 
conditions where hospitalization is deemed unnecessary if proper maintenance care is 
received), illustrates new access to necessary care; those increases where the long term 
hospitalization rate is not decreased is determined to be moral hazard. 
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B.  Literature Review 
Since the size of the DWL depends on measures of consumer responsiveness to 
price changes of health care, we now turn to the empirical literature which examines the 
correlations between insurance and health care consumption.  The literature on the 
relationship between insurance and an individual’s propensity to purchase health care 
falls into two major categories of studies.  The first category is randomized treatment 
control studies, which is characterized by a group of subjects receiving randomized 
treatments or assignments of different insurance policies and another group serving as the 
control.  This type of study is the “gold standard” because it allows for the largest degree 
of control by the experimenter over the conditions of the subjects and treatments.  In 
randomized treatment control studies regarding health insurance, researchers examine the 
differences between health outcomes or consumption patterns of the treatment and 
control groups.  Because these groups were treated the same except for the variable in 
question, the treatment and control groups are compared directly to examine whether 
insurance affects health outcomes.  The most notable randomized treatment control study 
is the RAND Experiment from 1971 which will be discussed below.  These studies are 
expensive and time consuming and are therefore rare.  The RAND Experiment is referred 
to extensively because it one of few randomized treatment control studies of health 
markets. 
 The other category of studies is observational studies, which constitute the bulk of 
the literature examine in this paper.  These studies take large compilations of data and 
examine the traits of individuals and their health outcomes and consumption patterns.  
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Statistical analysis yields correlations between these variables and the probability of a 
specified outcome to determine if the relationship between the two is significant.  This 
dataset differs from those used in randomized treatment control studies because the 
outcomes are observational in nature and therefore the environment of the individual or 
their treatments cannot be directly controlled.  The group of individuals may be randomly 
selected to participate in an observational study, but within these groups, the treatments 
cannot be applied consistently because the data is being collected is the result of choices 
on the part of the subjects.  There is a tradeoff between external and internal validity 
between observational studies and randomized treatment control experiments.  
Observational studies are externally valid in the sense that they can include a very large 
population of subjects from diverse areas relatively easily, but there are internal 
variations between the treatments of each subject which are hard to control for.  
Randomized treatment control studies are internally valid in the sense that each subject is 
treated consistently, except for the variable in question, but are limited in the sense that 
these studies are typically conducted on small populations in small geographic areas.  
Since randomized treatment control studies are so costly to perform, they cannot be 
conducted nationally and therefore may only describe the behaviors of a small subset of 
the population.  Both types of studies are discussed in this paper to conduct the most 
accurate analysis of the relationship between health insurance and care consumption 
patterns as possible. 
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C.  Review of Randomized Treatment Control Studies 
The 15 year RAND Health Insurance Experiment from 1971 to 1986 was the 
most notable randomized treatment control study in the social sciences conducted in the 
United States.  The RAND Experiment studied the impact of generosity of insurance 
coverage on health and health care use.  Analysis of the RAND Experiment by affiliates 
of the RAND Corporation found that cost-sharing policies such as coinsurance or 
copayments reduced both the amount of unnecessary and necessary health care 
purchases.  The goal was to determine the optimal level of coinsurance as to reduce the 
level of moral hazard (Brooke et al, 1984). In the RAND Experiment, 5809 subjects were 
randomly assigned to various insurance coverage plans of no cost sharing, 25, 50, or 95 
percent coinsurance rates (Keeler, 1992).  
 Each family received monthly monetary “participation incentives” and a 
“completion bonus” at the end of the study to decrease the level of attrition among 
subjects (Newhouse et al, 2007).  The level of attrition and its impact on the results was 
criticized by Nyman (2007).  He claimed that the findings of the RAND Experiment -that 
there was a decrease in health care expenditures as coinsurance increased- were due to 
the high level of attrition among subjects.  He argued that those people who had high 
levels of coinsurance left the study and found alternative insurance because they could 
not afford their treatment.  This would eliminate a large amount of health care spending 
recorded in the study if those who needed to purchase health care left the experiment 
before they purchased it (Nyman, 2007).  Newhouse (2007) countered this argument by 
pointing out the presence of monetary “participation incentives” and a “completion 
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bonus”.  He argued that dropping out of the study was against the financial interest of 
individuals because of these monetary incentives.  He also drew attention to data which 
shows no change in hospitalization rates of those who dropped out of the study before 
and after they left.  Since there was no change in hospitalization and there were no 
financial incentives for any one group to drop out of the study, I find the effect of attrition 
to be negligible.  
Critiquing the RAND Experiment, Nyman (2007) argued that the RAND 
Experiment shows both the level of unnecessary moral hazard experienced by increasing 
the level of insurance for consumers, as well as the level of health care the insured will 
now consume because they gained access to previously unattainable care.  This latter 
variation of moral hazard, Nyman argued, is beneficial to the population and represents 
an increase in welfare.  This original premise, that the increased level of moral hazard 
would have a large effect, is debatable because health care is shown to be generally 
inelastic, so any increase in moral hazard would be small.  The impact on the welfare of 
individuals who reduced health care purchases is also debatable.  In Keeler’s analysis of 
the RAND experiment, he attributed the decline in blood pressure control, corrected 
vision, and oral health to increased cost sharing, but stated that there are no other 
negative health effects (Keeler, 1992).  Other reviews of the RAND Experiment 
explained that there was no change in the health of individuals with various coinsurance 
rates except for those with low incomes (Normand, 1994).  This could be explained by 
the ability of those with high incomes to compensate for high coinsurance rates because 
of their increased ability to pay for health care.  They offset the increased cost for care 
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caused by a lower-coverage insurance policy with their own expendable income and 
therefore it would have been interesting if the RAND Experiment had analyzed whether 
the rate of health care was the same between insurance groups, indicating that these 
people just spent more of their own money for care instead of relying solely upon the 
insurance plan, resulting in negligible differences in health outcomes between groups. 
A downside of the RAND Experiment is that the data was collected in the 1970s 
and 1980s, over a quarter of a century ago.  The themes of this research may hold true 
over time, but the realm of health care and insurance has changed significantly since then.  
For instance, there are now many different insurance types such as PPOs, HMOs, and 
HSAs which were not considered in that study.  The health care community would 
benefit from another study such as the RAND Experiment to incorporate the various new 
insurance options.  This type of experimental study is very expensive, so in this paper, 
observational data was utilized. 
D.  Review of Observational Studies 
 The other branch of literature examined falls under the scope of observational 
studies.  These studies lack the ability to control the treatment of individuals, because the 
measured outcomes are the result of individual decisions by the subjects.  But, 
observational studies do allow for large numbers of respondents with few negative moral 
implications because an authority is not assigning on possibly beneficial or harmful 
policies because the treatments have been essentially self assigned.  One such 
observational study conducted by Goldman et al (2007), looked specifically at the 
influence of coinsurance rates on prescription drug spending found that with every ten 
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percent increase in coinsurance rates, there was a two to six percent decrease in the level 
of prescription drug spending.  They also associated increasing coinsurance rates with 
decreased treatment with drugs, and increased risk of discontinuation of care by patients.  
This decrease in treatment with drugs could be beneficial because there would be less 
over-prescription of antibiotics and unnecessary medications, and also that doctors would 
prescribe the generic form of the drug, changes which decrease medical costs.  The article 
stated that the welfare benefit is unknown because there could also be a decrease in 
health in the long term if patients do not take necessary drugs prescribed to them due to 
prohibitory coinsurance rates.  It would be difficult to determine the long run cost of 
declining costly prescription medications, because it is hard to directly link any illness as 
the effect of the decrease in prescription drug usage.  This is exemplified in Graph 2 by 
shifts in demand curves with and without insurance. 
The demand for health care is based on the marginal benefit of consuming an 
additional unit of health care, or the patient’s willingness and ability to pay.  The 
insurance effect is the impact on the quantity of care consumed with insurance.  Health 
care and health insurance are not typical goods.  There is an equity issue associated with 
access to quality health care which rests on the premise that individuals should have 
access to health care no matter their financial situation, similar to the idea of access to 
education.  It is very important for health care to be provided to everyone because there 
are many positive externalities associated with health care.  A healthy population is able 
to be an efficient workforce, and since productivity is social, quality health care has a 
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positive social welfare effect.  There are also the benefits derived from the altruistic want 
for everyone to have access to quality health care (Sen, 2004). 
 When individuals are uninsured, their ability to pay or ability is less than the cost 
of care, leading to dead-weight-loss (labeled DWL A) or inefficiency because they are 
under-consuming health care.  Normally, a lack of ability to pay for a good would not 
cause this shift in the demand curve, but low income individuals are also constrained by 
credit because it is difficult for them to obtain loans and credit to pay for health care.  
These individuals are missing out on care where the true marginal benefits exceed the 
marginal costs of care.  This is illustrated in Graph 2 by the left most demand curve with 
the associated loss of marginal benefits to the patient shaded in grey.  The uninsured 
individual consumes the quantity X1 of health care which is less than the most efficient 
quantity of health care consumption, X2.   The under consumption of prescription drugs 
discussed by Goldman et al (2007) would be illustrated by the Dno ins curve, because 
individuals are not consuming necessary care.  The demand curve with the true marginal 
benefits of care (MBtrue), or middle curve on Graph 2, represents the most efficient level 
of insurance, or where the price of care is equal to the marginal benefits of care 
consumption for each patient.   
On the other hand, when coinsurance rates or co-payments are too low, the price 
of health care is artificially lowered from the perspective of the patient and they are 
willing to purchase more health care at this lower price.  This shifts the demand curve out 
because a patient’s ability and willingness to pay for care at this lower price has 
increased.  Since the demand curve also theoretically illustrates the marginal benefits of 
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consumption, a higher demand curve than the “true” level of demand articulates that the 
marginal benefits are not maximized at this level of demand.  Patients then consume the 
quantity X3 of care again generating dead-weight-loss (labeled DWL B) because the 
marginal costs of care far exceed the marginal benefits of care for the patient but they are 
still consuming care because it is at a low dollar cost to the individual, but taxing on the 
overall system (Graph 2). 
 
Graph 2.  The insurance effect causes under consumption of care if patients do not have 
enough insurance and over consumption of care if they are over insured. 
 
Levy and Meltzer (2007) assert that the causality established by other studies may 
not be due to the effect of health insurance on health, but instead reflects the presence of 
unobservable factors.  These authors’ findings are consistent with the RAND study 
analysis, stating that, “health insurance certainly increases the quantity of health care 
consumed,” (Levy and Meltzer, 2007) but they go on to show that individuals receive less 
marginal benefit for each additional unit of health care consumption, despite this increase 
in spending.  This article attempted to determine which policy will be the most cost-
effective and beneficial for the public to increase insurance coverage to a greater portion 
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of the population while maximizing marginal benefits.  When discussing marginal social 
costs and benefits, we are mainly referring to the effects on the individual and society of 
consuming more care.  Society benefits from people being disease-free and healthy 
enough to work, but incurs a cost when the scarce resources of health care are consumed 
because of the fixed supply of health care.  Individuals benefit from consuming health 
care, but after a certain level, the marginal benefits of consuming an additional unit of 
health care diminish and it is no longer efficient to consume more care past this level. 
There is also uncertainty in determining the true marginal benefits of care. It has 
been shown that there are similar, or even worse, health outcomes with higher health care 
spending when comparing cities of similar demographic composition (Gawande, 2009).  
The reason we see under and over consumption of care is partly due to the fact that we do 
not know what the ideal level of health care consumption should be.  We are unsure of 
the true marginal benefits of varying procedures as well as the true marginal benefits of 
each dollar spent.  This uncertainty prevents us from promoting ideal health care 
consumption and should be probed in further research because there are massive 
efficiency implications if this ideal level can be determined. 
Since there is a decrease in demand for health care from increasing the 
coinsurance rates, we must look at whether this decrease in demand has any effect on the 
market price of medical care.  The rising net cost of health care is a concern in the health 
care industry and finding a way to manipulate the market price of health care would be 
beneficial.  Unfortunately, analysis on the topic of the effect of coinsurance and overall 
medical expenditures concludes that there would be little to no effect on the price of 
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medical care by increasing coinsurance rates.  In reality, the marginal social costs, or 
supply curves, are not horizontal as depicted in the graphs for simplicity.  Despite the 
change in demand, which is elastic, by consumers with higher coinsurance rates, the 
supply of medical care is very inelastic and therefore the price will not change in the long 
run (Arrow, 1973).  This brings us to the short run and long run cost analysis regarding 
different insurance policies. 
E.  Cost Sharing and Deductible Analysis 
 In the short run, the deductible faced by the consumer plays a large role in 
consumption of care because it dictates the price of care.  A deductible is the amount of 
money a person must spend per year before an insurance company will step in and pay 
the remainder.  The size of the deductible is depicted as the distance from points A to B 
on Graph 3.  A very low deductible (A1 to B1) encourages people to spend the small 
amount of money quickly and then consume a large amount of health care because the 
remainder of care expenditures cost nothing monetarily from the perspective of the 
consumer.  This can lead to inefficiency, as depicted in Graph 3. 
 
Graph 3. Marginal costs and benefits of spending a CDHP deductible from the 
perspective of the consumer.  MSC is marginal social costs. 
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 The demand curve represents the willingness and ability of the patient to pay, the 
horizontal line the marginal social costs of care, or the market price, and the dashed line 
the level of premium or deductible the patient faces.  The shaded triangle above the 
dashed line (X) is the marginal costs to the individual of spending the deductible and 
consuming additional care at zero cost, and the shaded triangle below the dashed line (Y) 
represents the marginal benefits of spending the entire deductible.  In other words, from 
points A1 to B1 in the small deductible panel, the individual pays the full marginal social 
cost, and then after point B1 the individual consumes to the point Qs to maximize 
marginal benefits.  The dollar value of the personal loss from consuming from A1 to B1 is 
“X” and the dollar value of the personal gain from consuming from B1 to Qs is “Y”.  If Y-
X < 0, the consumer does not spend the entire deductible because they would not receive 
enough marginal benefits from additional care consumed at zero cost to compensate for 
the cost of the entire deductible.  Conversely, if Y-X > 0, the consumer spends the entire 
deductible because they would receive as much care as they wanted at a low cost because 
their deductible is easily met.  This is represented by the Small Deductible graph because 
the marginal costs of care are easily overcome and unnecessary care is consumed.  The 
ideal level of deductible should be where X = Y so that the marginal costs and benefits of 
spending the entire deductible are equal for the consumer.  
Making the consumer more responsible for the costs of health care introduces a 
new cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of the patient.  Consumer-Driven Health 
Plans, or CDHPs, set high premiums or deductibles and the patient must weigh their 
marginal benefits of care against the costs up to a certain point, but after that deductible 
22 
 
22 
has been met, the cost of additional care moves to zero, artificially changing the cost of 
care from the perspective of the patient.  With CDHPs, patients can chose where and 
when they consume health care, but they bear more of the costs themselves.  CDHPs 
have been found to reduce total health care expenditures compared to managed care 
plans, but in the long run, they are found to have higher costs per hospitalization 
admission (Parente et al, 2004).  The goal of CDHPs is to facilitate competition between 
health care providers by giving the patients control over their health care spending.  This 
market-based approach to health care provision encourages consumers to cut costs by 
giving them a financial stake in their health care.  The intention of CDHPs is to reduce 
moral hazard by making patients face the full marginal costs of their own health care.  
Fee-for-service plans and other plans which detach the patient from the financial side of 
health care, give incentives for consumers to be indifferent to costs (Callahan, 2008).  
Putting the patient in control of their own health care spending reduces short run costs 
because the patient has fewer visits to the doctor.  CDHPs are included in the “other 
private” insurance category among other insurance types for the purposes of this study so 
it is difficult to derive any direct conclusions about CDHPs with these regressions.  
Examining both inexpensive short run and costly long run care is crucial in identifying 
efficient insurance systems. 
F.  Managed Care Analysis 
 
Another type of health insurance policy, HMOs or Health Maintenance 
Organizations, uses a different combination of patient-directed and provider-directed 
mechanisms to effect spending than CDHPs.  HMOs use three main mechanisms for 
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reducing health care spending: gate-keepers, capitation, and promotion of preventative 
care.   
Gate keepers refer to the practice of HMOs to have each patient first be seen by a 
primary physician, or “gate keeper”.  This procedure reduces costs because primary 
health care is less expensive and it often eliminates the need of seeing a specialist, which 
is much more costly (Fang et al, 2009).  Since the patient pays the same amount, there are 
incentives for the hospital to create access to inexpensive care so that future, more 
expensive, hospitalizations and specialist visits are avoided.   Forcing primary physicians 
to become restrictive gatekeepers may cut costs, but may also have a negative effect on 
the moral authority of doctors.  The role of a gatekeeper can either be a physician who 
efficiently identifies which specialist a patient should see and what kind of care they 
need, or a physician whose sole purpose is to decrease costs by limiting access to care 
which may be necessary (Starfield 1992, Manson 1995).  This distinction is hazy because 
both roles are assumed by the gatekeeper; they are responsible for directing patients to 
the most cost-effective route of care.  Whether this route is also the one of highest quality 
of care is currently being questioned as our health care system evolves and as HMOs 
steer away from the incentives which generate very restrictive “gatekeeper” primary 
physicians. 
Capitation is when an HMO or Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) decreases 
costs by instituting financial disincentives to provide more care.  If a primary doctor is a 
part of an HMO with capitation policies and they refer the patient to a specialist or order 
an expensive test outside of the standard procedure for these symptoms, they may not be 
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reimbursed as highly for the visit or may incur some other financial disincentive.  These 
policies reduce incentives for induced demand, or treating patients more frequently or in 
more costly ways than necessary to increase their own incomes.  
Emphasizing preventative medicine is a method used by HMOs to limit the 
instance of costly hospitalizations in the long run.  Literature suggests that HMOs induce 
the patient to seek frequent preventative care visits because the consumer pays one price 
no matter how much care they receive.  Although they frequent the doctor more often, 
their overall costs in the long run are lower than with other plans because they are less 
likely to need to undergo expensive, longer hospitalizations in the future.  It was found 
that a 10 percent increase in HMO market penetration decreases hospitalizations for 
ambulatory care conditions, also known as preventable hospitalizations, by 3.8 percent 
(Zhan et al, 2004).  Ambulatory care conditions are those conditions for which 
hospitalizations are avoidable if proper preventative care had been received.   
Reasons for admission of a patient into a hospital are grouped into three 
categories in studies analyzing hospital use.  The first group consists of those conditions 
where the outpatient care received has little to no effect on whether the patient is 
hospitalized.  These are conditions for which preventative care has little impact on 
outcome.  Another group encompasses those conditions which are not considered to 
require hospitalization if effective preventative or maintenance care is received, also 
called ambulatory care sensitive conditions.  The third category is referral-sensitive care 
such as expensive surgery or diagnostic tests requiring advanced technology (Billings et 
al, 1993).  Hospitalization for conditions considered to be ambulatory care sensitive, is an 
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indicator for problems with access to primary health care (Millman, 1993).  A list of 
ambulatory sensitive care conditions (ASCH) can be found in Laditka et al (2003).   
It has been found that those with HMO plans demand less hospitalizations 
indicating that their demand of different types of health services varies from those with 
other plans (Zhan et al, 2004).  Graph 4 illustrates the difference between the demand 
curves of patients with non-HMO and HMO insurance policies.  Panel A shows that 
patients with non-HMO insurance plans demand less preventative care and those with 
HMOs demand more preventative care because of the incentives inherent within those 
plans.  This trend of an increased consumption of preventative care in HMOs could 
explain the lower rate found in literature of expensive hospitalizations.  Panel B shows 
that HMO insured individuals consume are hospitalized less than those with non-HMO 
plans.  This change in the quantity demanded of each type of care saves costs in HMOs 
because preventative care is much less expensive than hospitalizations. 
 
Graph 4.  Side-by-side preventative care and long run hospitalization demand curves for 
HMO and Non-HMO plans. 
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A study by Deb et al (2006) shows that those in HMO plans go to the Emergency 
Room 90 percent more often and have 90 percent more doctor’s visits than those with 
non-HMO plans.  This is a surprising result, because it is inefficient for a health care 
provider to have their patients frequent the ER.  This could indicate a large source of 
inefficiency in the way HMOs provide care.  Their plans do not create incentives for the 
patient to distinguish between ER and doctor’s office care and therefore the patient 
chooses the immediate care option, which is the ER.  This increase in doctor’s visits may 
be the result of the emphasis on preventative care and would be the reason hospitalization 
for ambulatory care conditions decreases in the long run, thereby decreasing costs.   
Although there is certainly evidence for cost containment by HMOs during the 
HMO “boom” from 1990-94, since then, those policies enacted by HMOs which were 
most successful at cutting costs have been rescinded due to decreased patient satisfaction.  
Decreasing the restrictive aspects of HMOs has lead to a decrease in their efficiency and 
now HMOs have limited cost-cutting effects.  This decreased efficiency of HMOs in 
terms of cost-containment may continue until HMOs are no longer more efficient than 
other sources of insurance, so policies which encourage employees towards managed care 
plans, may not have the same degree of a desired effect as they did in the 1990s (Shen 
and Melnick, 2006).  A study of for-profit HMOs and non-profit HMOs found that the 
quality ratings of non-profit HMOs were much higher than for-profit HMOs.  The article 
attributed this difference to the incentive of for-profit HMOs to restrict and “skimp” on 
health care for its members (Burkey et al, 2008).  The article concluded with the idea that 
HMOs are the only way to guarantee health care but the quality of said health care is 
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variable.  Studies have shown low physician satisfaction with HMOs, articulating the 
belief that the patient receives a lower quality of care (Christianson et al, 2005). 
Although HMOs may have issues, such as decreased patient and physician 
satisfaction (Christainson et al, 2005), with their mechanisms to cut costs, they are 
effective in doing so.  Efficiency analysis shows that areas with greater HMO penetration 
have a negative correlation with inefficiency, illustrating that HMOs decrease costs.  The 
source of the restriction of costs is unknown, but could be attributed to cutting access to 
health care for patients and decreasing the quality of care, but increasing the overall 
efficiency (Rosko, 2001).  These mechanisms are relatively effective because they work 
on both sides of the equation, they induce patients to consume inexpensive care, and they 
encourage physicians to treat patients more efficiently, a topic which is discussed in the 
next section. 
G.  Supply of Health Care Analysis: The Doctor’s Side 
 
Physicians may not have consensus on what is considered “appropriate” care.  In 
many cases, there is no set course of treatment for doctors and this independence of 
health care provision allows for a great deal of uncertainty but grants the ability for 
treatment to be tailored to each patient.  Uncertainty of which treatment is best for each 
patient is a factor which is hard to account for in regressions because it pertains to the 
physician’s training, overall medical knowledge, and level of risk aversion.  Even with 
the best training, doctors are still met with the uncertainty of what is the actual best 
treatment for the patient.  The general lack of evidence based medicine forces us to rely 
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heavily on the preferences of individual doctors which are affected by a variety of 
factors, including risk aversion and possibly supplier induced demand. 
 A prime example of the discrepancies in health care provision is discussed in an 
article by Atul Gawande (2009).  Gawande compared two small Texas towns, McAllen 
and El Paso, and found that McAllen had Medicare expenses of $15,000 per enrollee 
whereas El Paso had expenses of only $7,504 per enrollee.  This was an astounding 
difference for two towns of very similar socioeconomic and demographic statistics.  This 
huge variation in cost of health care was attributed to general overutilization of expensive 
health care with no benefits of better health outcomes or higher quality of care.  Gawande 
states that a patient coming in for the first time with pain from gallstones would have 
once been prescribed pain medication, and told to change their diet and be sent home, 
now “McAllen surgeons simply operate.”  This is an easy solution for possibly non-
compliant patients, but it also generates $700 more revenue for the physician (Gawande, 
2009).  It has been shown that states with the highest levels of Medicare spending 
actually had lower quality of care rankings than many other states (Baicker and Chandra, 
2004).  The high costs give patients more care, but not necessarily better care.  Fisher et 
al (2003) from Dartmouth’s Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice found that 
these patients were receiving very expensive care and not receiving preventative care, 
and also had longer ER wait times.  Not only were the patients receiving a poorer health 
outcome at this higher price, but they were not even receiving basic preventative care. 
Uncertainty and variability also arises from variation in the reimbursement of 
doctors and hospitals by different insurance plans.  These fluctuating reimbursement rates 
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may alter incentives to prescribe or provide certain services to patients.  It is hard to 
determine whether the outcome of a certain treatment pattern is due to the choices of the 
consumer or the provider of health care because there are no data in this survey about 
doctor’s choices except their final treatments. But, controlling for insurance type and 
premium captures some of this effect. 
Gawande speculates that doctors in McAllen provide more expensive care to 
increase their revenues, as an illustration of supplier induced demand.  With decreasing 
rates of reimbursement from the uninsured and public insurance plans, the doctor or 
hospital could make up for this difference by providing more expensive care.  A doctor 
can induce care by directly prescribing more tests or visits, and a hospital can induce care 
by instituting policies which pressure doctors to over-treat patients.  This is illustrated in 
Graph 5 by an increase in quantity of health care consumed at the low fee relative to the 
higher fee. 
        
Graph 5.  Supplier induced demand causes physicians to prescribe more expensive 
treatments increasing the costs of care.   
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The downward shift in the amount of income received per unit of health care 
delivered is represented by the lower y-intercept and less steep slope of the Low Fee 
curve.  The y-intercept values, A1 and A2, represent the income of the physician if no 
health care was induced, which is the point of appropriate quantity of health care.  At the 
lower fee, the intercept (A2) is lower than the intercept with the higher rate (A1) because 
the income of the physician is lower with the low fee.  The increase in supply of care 
seen above (shift from X1 to X2) due to a decrease in overall reimbursement rates creates 
waste just as the change in demand did as discussed earlier.  The shape of the 
indifference curves (IC curves) represents that doctors gain disutility by inducing more 
health care consumption.  This means that they need more income to make up for losing 
utility from each additional unit of health care they induce due to the income and 
substitution effects.  If the income of the doctor is decreased by lower fees, they 
compensate by providing more expensive treatments (substitution) or increasing the 
quantity of care supplied.   
This concept can be linked to the lower rates of reimbursement from Medicaid.  
Theoretically, since the rates are lower, physicians and hospitals could induce care from 
these patients to compensate for this cut in reimbursement.  This is a situation where it 
may actually reduce overall costs if Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates were 
increased.  This is a complex topic which merits further examination because it would be 
necessary to probe the market to determine the point at which the lower reimbursement 
rate is still high enough that doctors and hospitals do not induce care.   
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In the case where the low fee causes SID, the marginal social cost of health care 
consumption is greater than the marginal social benefit.  This inefficiency is caused by a 
supply-side shift in the market, instead of a demand-side shift as seen previously by 
deductible and co-insurance variation.  We are limited in that we can only measure the 
final consumption patterns in relation to different insurance types, which indicate the 
presence of incentives or disincentives, but cannot tell us whether these patterns are 
caused by supply or demand side factors.  Despite the primary origins of inefficiency, 
they all result in the overuse of expensive health care and therefore we should work to 
find and resolve these issues. 
H.  Efficiency Implications of Health Care Overuse 
 The increasing inefficiency discussed throughout this paper has severe 
implications for the state of health care.  One major source of inefficiency results from 
the overuse of Emergency Room visits because of the high cost for hospitals to provide 
round-the-clock care.  Zuckerman and Shen (2004) illustrated the significance of the 
growing burden on ERs across the United States.  They explain that visits to ERs 
increased 20 percent between 1992 and 2001, while this increase was not matched in 
creating more ERs.  Instead, the number of ERs fell 15 percent during this same time.  
Due to this inadequate amount of ERs with rising ER utilization, any plan that generates 
incentives to visit the ER should be deemed inefficient.  With long waits and not enough 
beds for patients, the ER is an extremely inefficient location to consume health care, both 
in terms of the opportunity cost of the patient’s time, and the burden on the ER itself of 
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being over utilized.  More doctor’s office visits rather than ER visits might yield lower 
overall marginal costs for the same care. 
There has been found to be a positive correlation between public health care plans 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, and inefficiency, but this increase in cost per admission 
could be attributed to an increase in PPS payments to urban hospitals in the 1990s 
(Rosko, 2001).  Contrary to popular belief, the uninsured are not the largest population 
which utilizes the ER.  Only 15 percent of ER use is from the uninsured, and the 
uninsured are just as likely to be frequent users of the ER as the privately insured 
(Zuckerman and Shen, 2004).  Zuckerman and Shen (2004) also found that those with 
public insurance were 2.08 times more likely to be frequent users of the ER, the most 
likely group to visit the ER.  This level of ER utilization is a focal point of this study 
because of the high degree of inefficiency caused by over utilization of the ER.  
Emphasizing research energies on efficiency implications of different policies is essential 
to determining which aspects of current policies should be preserved and removed in the 
process of health care reform. 
 
IV. Data  
The data source utilized in this study is the National Health Interview Survey 
from 2006.  The respondents were restricted to the noninstitutionalized population 18 
years of age and older form all 50 states, but the respondents also answered questions 
regarding their children.  The NHIS 2006 has a sample size of 75,716 in the Sample 
Adult Level with 36,561 (48.29 percent) of the respondents being male and 39,155 (51.71 
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percent) of the respondents being female.  The insurance status of the individual was 
found under the Family Level section of the questionnaire and their consumption of 
medical care was found under Sample Adult Level questionnaire.  The information from 
the files was merged to form the data set that will be examined in this study.  The policy 
differences between groups, SCHIP for children, and Medicare for the elderly, impact 
health care consumption and therefore age is controlled for. 
 A.  Level and Appropriateness of Care Measures 
Quantifying aspects of the health care market such as quality of health care, 
access to care, and appropriateness of care, is also very complicated.  The health status 
recorded in the interview survey is self-reported, and is reported as: excellent, good, fair, 
and poor.  These four categorical variables do not leave room for a continuous scale of 
health status and therefore may limit some of the conclusions which can be drawn from 
linking health status alone to another variable.  These broad categories are crude 
approximates of true health status and therefore may not capture the true health status of 
an individual. Quality of health care is also often self-reported leading to a bias because 
there is no standard which each individual is using to assess the overall quality of care, so 
health outcomes are used instead to indicate the quality of care received.  Access to 
health care is also difficult to quantify.  Access can be measured in terms of distance to 
the nearest hospital or by asking the respondent if they did not consume necessary health 
care for any reason.  In this study, the latter was used because the distance to the nearest 
hospital, Emergency Room, or clinic was not recorded.   
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Whether an individual received standard vaccinations illustrates the provision of 
basic preventative care.  The relationship between the types of insurance coverage and 
choosing not to get health care or prescriptions for financial reasons establishes the effect 
of insurance on consumption of necessary health care.  This study uses hypertension, 
asthma, diabetes, bronchitis, heart disease, heart attack, and angina, as indicator variables 
for ambulatory care sensitive conditions and the presence of these conditions paired with 
high hospitalization and ER utilization rates indicates inefficiency.  The patient’s usual 
location of health care was also examined in terms of whether the patient sought out 
health care at the appropriate location.  Doctor’s offices or outpatient clinics were 
deemed to be appropriate usual locations of care and the ER and free clinics were tagged 
as inappropriate locations of usual care because of their high financial toll on the 
provider.  The frequency of doctor’s visits, ER visits, hospitalizations and surgeries 
shows the degree to which the different locations and types of health care consumption 
are utilized.  Definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix 1 and the means for 
the full sample and measured sample can be found in Appendix 2. 
V. Methods 
This study examines three hypotheses regarding how insurance policies impact 
health care consumption.  The first hypothesis is that basic plans such as Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other government insurance will have higher rates of hospitalization and 
surgery because they do not emphasize preventative care, while HMOs and other types of 
private insurance will have lower rates of hospitalization and surgery.  The second 
hypothesis is that those with Medicare, Medicaid, and other government insurance plans 
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will frequent the ER more and the doctor’s office less than those with other private 
insurance.  The third hypothesis is that individuals with public insurance plans (Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other government insurance) will list the ER and free clinics as the 
primary location of health care more often than the uninsured or other private plans 
which will list a doctor’s office.   
There are difficulties in measuring the relationship between health care use and 
health insurance as described by Levy and Meltzer (2007), including the omitted variable 
bias inherent in the relationship between health insurance and health care use.  Omitted 
variable bias is when the variable in question is also correlated to other, unknown or 
unmeasured, variables which bias the regression coefficient.  As many control variables 
as possible are included to minimize omitted variable bias, but some bias may remain.  
Controlling for geographic region, place of birth, and race, accounts for some of the small 
area variations throughout the nation.  Education, sex, marital status, income, age, and 
self-reported health status will also be controlled for in all regressions.  The Grossman 
model indicates that education and income have large effects on consumption of care and 
accumulation of health stock and may also influence the decision to purchase health 
insurance (Folland, Goodman and Stano, 2007), so in order to examine the effects of 
insurance on health care consumption, controlling for these variables is necessary.  
Differences between how subpopulations consume health care have also been found by 
literature and will be examined (Levy and Meltzer, 2007).  One such group, those with 
chronic illnesses, will be addressed by controlling for chronic illness, since they 
consistently consume more health care.  These differences resulting from omitted 
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variable bias would skew the results because the changes in insurance policies would not 
be responsible for all the variations of the health of individuals.   
Endogeneity is another potential source of bias in the estimates.  In this context, 
those with poor health may decide to purchase more health insurance, knowing that they 
will be consuming more health care in the future than those with better health, 
confounding the correlation coefficient.  It is expected that endogeneity would bias the 
measured correlation between health insurance and health consumption so that there 
seems to be a larger correlation than the true causal influence of health insurance on 
health care consumption because individuals pick a plan which fits how they consume 
health care.  Endogeneity is hard to overcome in observational studies, but this problem is 
partially addressed by controlling for income, education, and health status. 
All regressions were run with all controls, without the income control, and 
without both the income and health status controls to test the problems with the issue of 
endogeneity.  Health status and income controls were removed and the correlation 
coefficients for each set of regressions are reported in each table.  By removing layers of 
controls one at a time, we can examine the degree of impact the removed control had on 
the regression by comparing the two sets.  If the values of the correlation coefficients or 
marginal effects do not change significantly between regression sets, the removed control 
had a small effect on the other variables, and therefore the insurance type has a large 
effect on the variables.   
 The regressions were also run for the samples of the privately insured separately 
to reveal the effects of different private insurance policies on the variables at hand.  One 
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limitation of these regressions is that they may not be fully generalized to the population 
because the measured sample may be skewed.  Those who knew that they had private 
insurance and what kind of private insurance they had were included in these regressions, 
so individuals may have been excluded who have private insurance, but did not know 
what kind.  The fact that some individuals knew what kind of insurance they had and that 
some did not, may reflect inherent differences between these two populations.  It is 
plausible that those who know what kind of insurance they have also know what sources 
of care are less expensive to them and may consume care differently than the group who 
does not know this information.  Those who are able to label their own insurance type 
represent a population with more information on the insurance market and therefore, by 
examining this group alone, we are ignoring the element of the population with minimal 
information on the insurance market.  The number of individuals with private insurance, 
but did not know what kind of private plan they had was 8,622, and 36,650 respondents 
with private insurance did know their insurance type.  One regression set was run 
including those listing other private insurance, and another set was run with those with 
other private insurance dropped from the data set.  Both sets of private insurance 
regressions were run relative to those with private HMOs or IPAs. 
A.  Statistical Analysis 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions were run for those variables which had 
scalar values, such as frequency of doctor’s visits, ER visits, and hospitalizations.  The 
equation shows the relationship between variables for scalar and binary data sets, where 
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β0 - β9 = coefficients to be estimated, X = a vector of other confounding variables, and εi 
= disturbance term. 
[1] Y[scalar]* = Xβ0 + β1HMO + β2PPO + β3POS + β4FFS + β5OTHPRIV + β6SSP + β7MEDIC 
+ β8GOV + β9NOINS + εi 
With OLS regressions, the slope is equal to the correlation coefficient because the 
variations between data points are constant.  It is these correlation coefficients which are 
compared in the analysis of the output data to determine the relationship between 
specified variables. 
A probit regression was run instead of an OLS regression for binary variables 
because many of the assumptions made by the OLS regression are violated by this data 
set.  The main issue is the heteroscedasticity of the limited dependent variables.  OLS 
regressions assume a constant variance among variables and in this study the variables 
have a range of variances, or are heteroscedastic.  Since the variance is not constant and 
predictions can fall outside of the [0,1] range, the probit regression classifies each 
variable as a “1” or “0” if the prediction coefficient is above or below a certain threshold.  
As the variance between data points and the regression line gets smaller, the slope 
between the two points approaches the marginal effect.  Dummy variables were created 
for variables examined with a binary system, and probit regressions were run using 
STATA for each type of insurance.  This binary system was used for variables such as 
the site for routine care, whether vaccines had been administered, and whether the patient 
saw a nurse or physician’s assistant, general doctor, or specialist.  Equation [2] shows the 
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relationship between variables for binary variables, where β0 - β9 = coefficients to be 
estimated, X = a vector of other confounding variables, and εi = disturbance term. 
[2] y* = Xβ0 + β1HMO + β2PPO + β3POS + β4FFS + β5OTHPRIV + β6SSP + β7MEDIC + 
β8GOV + β9NOINS + εi 
y = 1  if y* > 0 
 y = 0  otherwise 
 The marginal effects are then a function of β’s and X’s which STATA calculates 
and are shown as functions in the analyses. The value, y* is not observed and is often 
referred to as a “latent” variable, and if this value is greater than zero, the observed y 
value is defined as “1”.  If we are examining whether or not an individual went to the ER, 
y* would be defined as the desire and ability of a person to go to the ER.  This level of 
desire and ability cannot be directly observed, only the final outcome of whether or not 
the person went to the ER.   
Since the variance is irregular and predictions can fall outside of the [0,1] range, 
we assume that var(εi) = 1 which means the scale of y* is fixed so that we can define the 
probability of y = 1 in Equation [3] where, F = cumulative normal distribution function.  
[3] P = Prob(y = 1) = Prob [εi > -(Xβ0 + β1HMO + β2PPO + β3POS + β4FFS + 
β5OTHPRIV + β6SSP + β7MEDIC + β8GOV + β9NOINS)] 
 P = 1 – F[-(Xβ0 + β1HMO + β2PPO + β3POS + β4FFS + β5OTHPRIV + β6SSP + 
β7MEDIC + β8GOV + β9NOINS)] 
Probit regressions also include a variable which is the probability density function 
for a standardized normal variable (Φ).  It is important to include this correction factor to 
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determine accurate estimated correlation coefficients for prediction purposes because of 
disproportionate sampling, or unequal numbers of observations in each group.  This term 
is added when examining how changes in the explanatory variables affect the 
probabilities determined above.  For a probit regression,  
[4] ∂P/∂x = βΦ(Z) 
where,  
      k 
Z = β0 + ∑ (βx) . 
                    i = 1 
 
 With a probit regression, these derivatives are not constant, so they must be 
calculated for each explanatory variable (Maddala and Lahiri, 2009).  STATA calculates 
these marginal effects and these values are displayed in the summary tables reported in 
the appendices. 
 For the variable regarding the out of pocket amount of expenditures on health 
care, an ordered probit regression was used.  Since the dependant variable is multinomial, 
or that different expenditures are reported as ranges, a normal probit or OLS regression 
only reports on the average effect.  The ordered probit model allows the marginal effects 
going from one category to another to be non-linear.  In other words, an ordered probit 
allows the probability of ending up in each category to vary while an OLS regression 
averages the effects of all the categories.  Like in the probit model, there is a latent y* 
variable which either exceeds or falls below a threshold, µ, but in this case, there is a 
threshold value for each category.  Each category represents a range of annual out of 
pocket health care expenditures, where category 0 is zero dollars spent, category 1 is 0-
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$499, category 2 is $500-$1,999, category 3 is $2,000-$2,999, category 4 is $3,000-
$4,999, and category 5 is over $5,000 spent.  Here, 
[5]  y = n  if µn-1 < y* < µn ,  
where, n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or the desired category.  The same equation for the marginal 
effects as the probit model is used [2].  Since we want to probe how changes in insurance, 
or the “predictor” variables, change the probability of an individual falling into each 
category, we must find the probability of observing each outcome.  This is found by 
calculating the probability of finding y* between the two threshold values, or, 
[6] P(y = n) = P(µn-1 < y* < µn) , 
and since we established that y* = Xβ + εi ,  
[7] P(y = n) = P(µn-1 < Xβ + εi < µn) 
    = P(µn-1 - Xβ < εi < µn - Xβ) 
    = Φ(µn-1 – Xβ) – Φ(µn – Xβ) ,  
where Φ is the probability density function for a standardized normal variable as seen in 
equation [4] (Jackman, 2000). 
Chi-squared tests will be run on all regression sets to determine statistically 
significant differences between insurance types.  A 95 percent confidence interval will be 
used to determine statistical significance.  The marginal effects of the regressions are 
summarized in Appendix 3 with all insurance types, and a complete example of a set of 
the marginal effects with all controls can be found in Appendix 4. 
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VI. Discussion 
 The findings derived from analysis of the correlation coefficients, marginal 
effects and chi square tests are broken down into sections based on their implications.  
First, access and affordability of care will be discussed, followed by an analysis on the 
utilization of types of health care.  The type of health professional seen was also 
examined and will be discussed in relation to expensive versus inexpensive care 
consumption by patients.  The findings regarding the usual location of health care 
consumption have major efficiency, or inefficiency, implications and are presented in 
regards to which plans encourage efficient or inefficient consumption of care.  The 
location of care consumption is of great consequence because it highlights severe 
inefficiencies in insurance plans if they encourage individuals to consume care routinely 
at an ER or free clinic. 
A.  Affordability of Care and Preventative Care Analysis 
 The overall out of pocket spending for individuals was examined and variations in 
these expenditures were found between insurance types.  Individuals with Medicaid plans 
were 10.7 and 7.1 percent more likely to spend zero or less than $500 out of pocket 
respectively than other plans.  Those with other government insurance and military 
insurance also followed this trend of being more likely to have spent between zero and 
$500 on health care out of pocket in the past year.  The marginal effects broken down for 
each range of expenditures are reported in Table 1 seen in Appendix 3.  These ranges are 
raw out of pocket expenditures and are not corrected in any way for the income of the 
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individual.  Only the amount spent on health care is assessed by this analysis, and the 
affordability of care is another issue which is examined next. 
Table 2 shows that all types of insurance were less likely to both delay care 
because of cost and to not get needed care because of cost than the uninsured.  This result 
was expected, but using a chi-squared test, it was found that those individuals with 
private insurance are less likely than those on Medicare and with other government 
insurance to delay care because of cost, are less likely than those on Medicare, Medicaid, 
and other government insurance to neglect to get needed care because of cost.  Likewise, 
all forms of insurance were less likely to not be able to afford prescription drugs than the 
uninsured, and those with private insurance were the least likely to not be able to afford 
prescription drugs for all types of insurance except military insurance.  
 The variation seen between regression sets with and without health status and 
income is consistent with the expected effects of health status and income on the 
specified variables.  The trends indicate that the coefficients without health status and 
income are less negative than those regressions which control for these factors.  These 
trends are consistent with the literature in that as health status and incomes rise, people 
would be less likely to delay or neglect needed care because of cost or not be able to 
afford prescriptions because if they are in excellent health, care is not needed and if they 
have a high income, affordability of care is not a problem.  It has also been shown that 
both health status and income are positively correlated with selection into a health 
insurance policy in general.  It follows that as health status increases and incomes rise, 
individuals may have increased access to insurance because insurance companies want to 
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insure them, and also are more likely to get plans with greater coverage because of 
employment.  Once these effects which skew the regressions in the positive direction are 
accounted for, the coefficient becomes more negative (Table 2). 
 Within the private insurance group, those with other private insurance and PPO or 
POS plans had statistically significant positive marginal effects on the probability of 
delaying care because of cost relative to those with HMOs or IPAs.  This demonstrates 
that those with HMOs or IPAs have a lower incidence of delaying medical care due to 
cost.  This trend continues with not obtaining needed care because of cost.  Those with 
other private insurance and PPO or POS plans are more likely to not obtain needed care 
because of cost than those with HMO or IPA plans.  Also, of the privately insured, those 
with other private insurance were the most likely to say that they cannot afford 
prescription drugs at a statistically significant level (Table 8).  This finding is interesting 
because it illustrates the trends discussed by the literature which state that HMOs cause 
people to have increased utilization of preventative care with fewer barriers to this cheap 
care.  It does not address the idea of HMOs limiting more expensive care via gatekeepers 
and capitation policies. 
To examine the provision of basic preventative care, regressions were run for 
whether individuals received pneumonia and Hepatitis B vaccines.  Having insurance 
increased the probability of getting a vaccine with the most likely people to get the 
vaccine being those with Medicare and military insurance for both vaccines (Table 3).  
Little information could be derived from the regressions concerning only private 
insurance for vaccinations, but it was found that those with PPO or POS plans were less 
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likely to have been vaccinated for pneumonia than those with other private insurance at 
the 0.05 significance level. 
B.  Frequency and Instance of Utilization of Health Care Analysis 
 To examine the utilization of care, both the frequency and instance of different 
types of care were analyzed.  The instance and frequency of overnight hospitalizations 
and surgery, and the frequency of ER visits and doctor’s visits regressions can be found 
in Tables 4 and 5.  It was found that those with private insurance, other government 
insurance, and military insurance have a lower incidence of reporting at least one 
overnight hospitalization than those with Medicare and Medicaid, with those with all 
types of insurance being more likely to spend a night in a hospital than the uninsured.  In 
terms of frequency of overnight hospitalizations, there was a positive correlation for all 
types of insurance, except for private insurance without controlling for income or health 
status, but this value was not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Those with private 
and military insurance had the lowest correlation coefficient and have a lower frequency 
of overnight hospitalizations than all other insurance types, except other government 
insurance (Table 4).  Among the privately insured, those with FFS plans were more 
likely to both list that they were hospitalized, and have the highest frequency of 
hospitalizations than those with HMOs/IPAs, PPOs/POSs, or other private insurance at a 
statistically significant level when the controls of income and health status were removed 
(Table 10).  This result of the FFS policies having the highest frequency of hospital visits 
is also consistent with the findings of regressions run without those listing other private 
insurance at a statistically significant level (Table 16). 
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 There is also a positive correlation between having at least one surgery and 
having some type of insurance, and chi-square tests indicate that those with private 
insurance have less surgery than those with Medicaid at a statistically significant level. 
The frequency of surgical procedures follows the same trend, with statistically significant 
positive correlation coefficients for all insurance types.  Those with Medicare and 
Medicaid are more likely to have a higher frequency of surgical procedures at a 
statistically significant level than those who are privately insured (Table 4).  When types 
of private insurance were examined separately, it was found that those with FFS plans 
were the least likely to have had surgery and also have a lower frequency of surgery than 
all other private insurance types at a 0.05 significance level.  This result was surprising 
because those with FFS plans have a higher incidence and frequency of overnight 
hospitalizations than all other plans, but have a lower incidence and frequency of surgery 
(Table 10).  Those with FFS plans are hospitalized overnight more frequently than 
others, but do not require surgery for these hospitalizations, therefore the cost of each 
hospitalization may not be as high as some other plans.  Hospitalizations for diabetes, 
bronchitis, pneumonia, some cancers, flu, and infectious diseases typically do not result 
in surgery, so those with FFS plans may be hospitalized for these types of conditions and 
therefore require less surgery.  The frequency of hospitalization is a good indicator of 
health care use, but it does not tell us what type of health care was consumed at each 
hospitalization so we can derive no direct information from the data about cost per 
hospitalization.  This limits the analysis of efficiency implications, but it is possible that 
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high levels of hospitalizations and low frequency of surgery indicates an excessive use of 
overnight observational stays.   
An example of possible overuse of overnight hospitalizations is the stay of 
patients in the Intensive Care Unit, ICU, after gastric bypass surgery.  The ICU is a more 
expensive location in the hospital to be kept overnight because of the increased level of 
supervision by nurses and doctors as well as the more advanced technology utilized to 
monitor the patient.  The movement of patients to the surgical floor is the goal of doctors 
and hospitals because it is less costly to the hospitals to monitor the patient and indicates 
positive outcomes of a procedure because the patient must be doing well to move them to 
the surgical floor.  It was found by Grover et al (2010) that the common post-operative 
stay of gastric bypass patients with obstructive sleep apnea in the ICU is an unnecessary 
precaution.  Typically, gastric bypass patients with obstructive sleep apnea are kept in the 
ICU overnight to allow for close observation to avoid pulmonary complications, but it 
was found that there were no difference in the length of overall hospital stay or major 
complications between group kept overnight in the ICU and the group moved directly to 
the surgical floor.  This indicates that the use of ICU beds for these gastric bypass 
patients with obstructive sleep apnea is an inefficient allocation of an expensive resource 
because the marginal benefits of keeping the patient in the ICU are very small. This 
inefficient length of expensive care is one major issue with the system, but the location of 
care can also yield inefficiency. 
 As previously discussed, the ER is an inefficient location to consume health care 
because of the high financial burden it places on hospitals.  Keeping an ER heavily 
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staffed around the clock is a massive drain on a hospital and ER use must be examined 
when searching for inefficiency.  It was found that the frequency of ER visits varies 
significantly between insurance types.  All insurance types except the privately insured 
have a positive correlation coefficient for frequency of ER visits.  This negative 
coefficient is not significant at the 0.05 level, except when income and health status are 
not controlled for, but it can be said with statistical significance that the privately insured 
frequent the ER less often than those with Medicare, Medicaid and other government 
insurance (Table 5).  This finding is interesting because the ER is an inefficient location 
of health care consumption due to high costs incurred by the hospital.  It is expected that 
the uninsured would frequent the ER to a large extent because they would receive care 
regardless of their ability to pay.  It is surprising that some insurance plans encourage 
individuals to frequent the ER more often than the uninsured, as represented by the 
positive correlation coefficient.  This result could be the result of public plans such as 
Medicare not covering regular checkups.  To minimize the cost to the individual, a person 
would go to the ER for routine care because it would cost less than making a doctor’s 
appointment.  Also, even if a doctor’s appointment is covered by Medicaid many 
physicians do not accept or limit Medicaid patients because the reimbursement rate is 
lower than for those with private plans.  In this light, it is possible that increasing 
reimbursement to physicians and covering routine care by Medicaid and Medicare may 
reduce overall costs.  Inducing individuals not to utilize the ER as often would yield a net 
savings for the system if they instead consumed care at a more efficient location and 
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level.  Plans which encourage an increased frequency of ER visits should be reexamined 
to eliminate this inefficient consumption of health care.  
When the privately insured were examined alone, there was not found to be any 
statistically significant difference in ER utilization between insurance types.  It would be 
expected that since the privately insured had the lowest frequency of ER visits, that this 
would be compensated for by an increase in the frequency of doctor’s visits relative to all 
other types of insurance, but this is not the case.  It was found that all types of insurance 
had a positive relationship with frequency of doctor’s visits, but those with private 
insurance had a lower frequency of doctor’s visits than all other insurance types except 
other government insurance at a statistically significant level.  Those with Medicaid had 
the highest correlation coefficient relative to all other types of insurance, meaning that 
they have the highest frequency of doctor’s visits (Table 5).  Those with Medicaid 
insurance plans were also the most likely to have had ten or more doctor’s visits in the 
past year at a statistically significant level (Table 5).  Since health status, ambulatory care 
conditions, and chronic conditions are controlled for in that regression set, it follows that 
those with Medicare plans are consuming care inefficiently in the form of excessive 
doctor’s visits.  This illustrates the imperfect capturing of true health by the controls of 
health status, ambulatory care conditions, and chronic conditions.  The true health status 
is controlled for as much as possible with the data set at hand because of availability of 
data.  Including other health controls would severely limit the sample size and could lead 
to inaccurate sample populations. 
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  Among the privately insured, those with PPO plans frequent the doctor’s office 
more than those with HMO or other private insurance plans at a statistically significant 
level (Table 11).  It was also found that when the other private insurance group is 
dropped from the sample, PPO plan individuals frequent the doctor more often than those 
with HMOs (Table 17).  Those with PPO plans were also more likely than those with 
HMO plans to list having ten or more doctor’s visits in the past year.  This trend 
continues in regressions which control for health status and in those which do not control 
for health status.  This implies that with the effects of health status removed, PPO 
enrollees are consuming more care in the form of doctor’s visits than other private 
insurance types (Table 11). 
 All regressions including health status were run with an ambulatory care sensitive 
condition indicator variable as a control, but the coefficients of these variables are also 
included in Tables 5, 11, and 17.  This ambulatory care sensitive condition variable may 
reveal how insurers and patients select for health insurance.  Those plans with 
probabilities of ambulatory care conditions may exhibit endogeneity, meaning that 
individuals may have selected specific plans because of their health status and conditions 
before they acquired these plans.  Causality is difficult to determine but it is important to 
discuss that self selection or insurer selection may have resulted in those with ambulatory 
care sensitive conditions having these plans.  Therefore, it is possible that these 
conditions are not the result of the plans, but instead that the plan chosen by an individual 
is the result of their underlying health status.  The health status of the individual was 
controlled for by including self reported health status, ambulatory care conditions, stroke, 
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and chronic conditions such as cancer.  Although all of these factors were controlled for, 
they do not assess the complete picture of the health of the individual.  It is these omitted 
health controls which contribute to the underlying health status which may be skewing 
coefficients and causing endogeneity. 
C.  Type of Health Care Consumption Analysis 
 The type of health care professional seen - nurse or physician’s assistant, general 
MD, or specialist - was also examined.  It was found that there were positive correlations 
between all insurance types and seeing all health care professional types relative to the 
uninsured, as expected.  When asked if a nurse or physician’s assistant (PA) was seen, 
those with military insurance had the highest measured impact at a statistically significant 
level.  It was also found that those with Medicare plans were the least likely of all 
insurance types to have seen a general MD.  Also, the privately insured reported seeing a 
general MD less than those with Medicaid and other government insurance.  For 
specialist visits, all types of insurance had positive correlation coefficients, but they were 
not found to be different at a statistically significant level (Table 6). 
 When private insurance was examined alone, it was found that those with FFS 
plans were the least likely to have seen a general MD in regressions with and without 
health status and insurance controls.  It was also found that there were no statistically 
significant differences among private insurance types for whether they had seen a nurse 
or physician’s assistant.  Those with PPO or POS plans were more likely to have seen a 
specialist than those with other private insurance or HMO plans (Table 12). 
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D.  Location of Health Care Consumption Analysis 
 The marginal effects between groups with and without health status and income 
controls are very similar for those who listed the usual location of health care 
consumption as the ER.  This means that the insurance type has a large impact on the 
outcome of whether an individual utilizes the ER as their usual location of health care.  
Those with private insurance are less likely to have the ER as their usual location of care 
than all other types of insurance at a statistically significant level.  This finding is 
interesting, because it is inefficient to consume care at the ER, and these individuals are 
not only consuming care there, but listing the ER as their usual location of health care 
consumption; this is very inefficient.  There was little difference among the privately 
insured groups concerning whether the usual location of care is the ER, with very low 
marginal effect values for each private insurance type (Table 13).   
Those with private insurance are also the least likely to list their usual location of 
health care consumption as a free clinic at a statistically significant level.  This result was 
expected, but the degree of the differences is very large.  Individuals with private 
insurance were between 11 and 12 percentage points less likely than the uninsured to list 
a free clinic as the usual source of care, whereas military and other government insurance 
were between 12 percentage points and 10 percentage points more likely than the 
uninsured.  Free clinics are also very inefficient locations to receive health care because 
they are a financial drain on health care providers.  These very strong numbers indicate 
that other government and military insurance plans contain some inherent motivation for 
individuals to consume care inefficiently (Table 7).  Within the privately insured groups, 
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those with other private insurance were the most likely to list their usual location of care 
as a free clinic at the 0.05 significance level (Table 13). 
 For those with other government and military insurance, the marginal effects were 
statistically significant and negative, indicating that they are less likely to list the usual 
location of care listed as the office.  These two insurance types are the least likely to list a 
doctor’s office as the usual location of care than all other insurance types.  The most 
likely to list the doctor’s office as the usual location of care was the privately insured 
across all regression sets (Table 7).  Among the privately insured, individuals with other 
private insurance were the least likely to report a doctor’s office as the usual location of 
care (Table 13).  Those with private insurance are also the least likely to list an outpatient 
clinic as their usual location of care than all other types of insurance at a statistically 
significant level.  The insurance group that were the most likely to list an outpatient clinic 
as the usual location of health care consumption were those with military insurance 
policies.  This could be due to the structure of the veteran’s hospitals and an emphasis on 
outpatient care (Table 7).  There was little difference between the private insurance types 
for the outpatient clinic variable, implying that no one private plan encourages or 
discourages outpatient clinic use than another private plan in this study (Table 13). 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Efficiency analysis of various insurance policies is imperative when determining 
which methods of insurance provision should be expanded or reduced to help slow 
increasing health care costs.  A high degree of ER utilization is an indicator of inefficient 
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consumption of health care.  Since it was found that the privately insured frequent the ER 
less than Medicare and Medicaid, some aspect of Medicare and Medicaid is inducing 
individuals to consume more ER visits.  These incentives are important to identify so we 
can include them in an ideal insurance system.  It was also found that there were 
statistically significant positive correlations between the frequency of ER visits and 
individuals on Medicare, Medicaid, other government insurance, and military insurance, 
relative to the uninsured.  This illustrates major flaws in the system.  It would be expected 
that the uninsured would consume the most ER visits because the ER is a location with 
guaranteed access to quality health care, but these results indicate that some insurance 
plans induce individuals to consume more ER visits than the uninsured.  These results are 
consistent with the findings of Zuckerman and Shen (2004) who observed that public 
insurance plans, such as Medicare and Medicaid, were 2.08 times more likely to be 
frequent users of the ER, the highest correlation coefficient of all insurance types.   
The increased utilization of the ER by individuals on Medicare and Medicaid 
could be due to the characteristics of the policies which limit how enrollees can consume 
care.  Medicare does not cover doctor’s visits for routine care.  This means that it is 
cheapest for the individual to go to the ER or a free clinic for routine care than it would 
be to consume care efficiently at a doctor’s office.  This incentive could explain the 
findings in this paper and should be addressed in health care reform.  This unexpectedly 
high utilization of the ER by Medicaid enrollees could be due to the low reimbursement 
rates by Medicaid for routine doctor’s visits.  21.0 percent of doctors do not accept 
Medicaid enrollees as new patients because the reimbursement rates are so low, and this 
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figure rises to 24.7 percent with states with delays in reimbursement, magnifying the 
problem (Cunningham and O’Malley, 2009).  The low Medicaid participation rate of 
physicians forces people to consume care at other locations, such as the ER.  The fact that 
doctors are not accepting Medicaid amplifies the issues with access to health care.  Those 
on Medicaid have low incomes or disabilities by definition, so any decrease in access 
disproportionately disadvantages this group of individuals.  The equity issue then 
presents itself again; by providing low income individuals with insurance which does not 
maximize access to care, we are limiting the benefits this insurance can have.  Low 
reimbursement rates also may cause hospitals and doctors to induce the demand of health 
care by ordering more tests, as previously explained.  It may seem counterintuitive 
initially, but if the idea of supplier induced demand is true, it may lower the net costs of 
the system if Medicare covered routine doctor’s visits and Medicaid reimbursement rates 
were elevated because it would decrease incentives for the provision of unnecessary care.   
Overcrowding of ERs and low Medicaid reimbursement rates for treatment 
provided by the ER, has put financial stress on many hospitals causing them to close ERs 
(Steele et al, 2008).  In Califonia, ER closures have taken a significant toll on hospitals.  
Since 1998 in Los Angeles County alone, 40 ERs have closed while only one has opened 
(Los Angeles Times, 2007).  Medi-Cal, the Californian Medicaid service, has one of the 
lowest reimbursement rates and hospital administrators shave been forced to close the 
doors of their ERs in order to keep the whole hospital from going bankrupt.  This issue is 
not contained in California; nationally, ER utilization has increased by 26 percent, while 
the numbers of ERs has decreased by 9 percent in the past decade (Kellerman, 2006).  
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Each time an ER closes, the geographic area they serve faces an access to health care 
issue.  Because the reason the ERs are closing is that the ER is not getting reimbursed for 
the care they provide, the people who are getting displaced by this closure generally have 
low incomes.  Reducing health care access for a population which is ill-equipped to 
compensate for this change because they have minimal resources to gain access to quality 
care, illustrates an equity issue. Closing ERs and threatening to close entire hospitals has 
many negative social welfare implications, the most direct of which is the lack of access 
to health care.  As ERs close, the burden of patients then gets shifted to another, already 
stressed ER.  Moving patients around from overcrowded ER to overcrowded ER could 
compromise patient care and lead to poor health outcomes.   
Another interesting finding which merits more investigation is that FFS enrollees 
consume more overnight hospitalizations, but fewer surgeries than all other types of 
private insurance. Individuals with FFS plans may be hospitalized more frequently for 
conditions that do not require surgery such as diabetes, bronchitis, pneumonia, some 
cancers, flu, and infectious diseases.  Although the frequency of hospitalization is a good 
indicator of health care use; it does not tell us what type of health care was consumed at 
each hospitalization.  This lack of data limits the ability to determine if this pattern of 
consumption is efficient because we do not have information about cost per 
hospitalization.  It is both possible that high levels of hospitalizations and low frequency 
of surgery indicates an excessive use of overnight observational stays, or that other types 
of insurance are over-consuming surgeries whereas FFS patients do not.  Further research 
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is required to determine efficiency implications of this consumption pattern among FFS 
enrollees. 
The inefficiencies discussed here have many different origins which should be 
examined further.  Identifying and quantifying the flaws in the system is a first step; now 
we must find the root of these errors and correct them in order to improve health care 
provision and consumption.  The finding that Medicare and Medicaid patients consume 
abnormally high levels ER visits is astoundingly pertinent to the recent addition of more 
individuals to Medicaid.  The recently signed health care reform law adds more 
individuals to Medicaid and private insurance by expanding Medicaid qualifications and 
mandating health insurance.  Adding more people to plans which induce inefficient 
health care consumption will only magnify the current issue of rising health care cost 
when these reforms were intended to reduce costs.  The current reforms also raise 
Medicaid reimbursement rates, but whether these rates were increased enough to remedy 
the inefficiencies induced by these low rates is yet to be determined.  The Massachusetts 
reforms provide an example for current health reforms and a warning against the same 
pit-falls which have caused health care costs in Massachusetts to rise above their 
expected values.  More research is necessitated on this topic before we can hone in on the 
most efficient and applicable insurance policies for the United States, but it merits 
attention because without this understanding, it would be difficult to solve the problems 
in the health care system we face today. 
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IX. Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
NOINS 
 
No insurance coverage of any type 
MCARE 
 
Medicare 
MCAID 
 
Medicaid 
SINGSERV 
 
Single service plan 
PRIV 
 
Private health insurance 
PRIVHMOIPA 
 
 
Private insurance in the form of an HMO (Health Maintenance 
Organization) or IPA (Individual Provider Association) 
PRIVPPOPOS 
 
Private insurance in the form of a PPO or POS plan 
PRIVFFS 
 
Private insurance in the form of a FFS (Fee-for-Service) plan 
PRIVDRCH 
 
 
Private insurance plan that allows for patients to choose which 
doctor they prefer to see 
OTHGOVINS 
 
Other state-sponsored insurance 
MILITINS 
 
Military health care coverage 
INCLESS20k 
 
Whether family income is below $20,000 per year 
INC20kTO45k 
 
Whether family income is between $20,000 and $44,999 per year 
INC45kTO75k 
 
Whether family income is between $45,000 and $ 74,999 per year 
INCOVER75k Whether family income is over $75,000 per year 
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NORTHEAST 
 
Whether the person lives in the northeast 
MIDWEST 
 
Whether the person lives in the Midwest 
SOUTH 
 
Whether the person lives in the south 
WEST 
 
Whether the person lives in the west 
BLACK 
 
Whether the person listed themselves as black 
HISPANIC 
 
Whether the person listed themselves as Hispanic 
ASIAN 
 
Whether the person listed themselves as Asian 
AGE2 
 
The age of the individual squared 
AGEPERCENT 
 
The age of the individual divided by 100 
FEMALE 
 
Whether the person is female 
MARRIED 
 
Whether the person is married 
EXCELLENT 
 
Self-reported health status listed as excellent 
VERYGOOD 
 
Self-reported health status listed as very good 
GOOD 
 
Self-reported health status listed as good 
FAIR 
 
Self-reported health status listed as fair 
POOR 
 
Self-reported health status listed as poor 
BORNUSA 
 
Whether the individual was born in the United States 
NOHS 
 
Whether the individual never attended high school 
HSGRAD 
 
 
Whether the individual graduated from high school or received a 
GED equivalent only 
SOMECOL 
 
Whether the highest level of education an individual reached was 
attending some college 
 
ASSOCBA Whether the highest level of education an individual reached was 
63 
 
63 
 receiving an Associate degree or a BA 
 
GRADDEG 
 
Whether the highest level of education an individual reached was 
receiving a graduate degree 
 
VACCINEPNU 
 
Whether the individual received a pneumonia vaccine 
VACCINEHEPB 
 
Whether the individual received an hepatitis B vaccine 
AMBUL 
 
 
 
Whether the individual suffers from an ambulatory care 
condition, i.e. hypertension, asthma, diabetes, bronchitis, heart 
disease, heart attack, or angina 
HYPERTEN 
 
 
Whether the individual has ever been told that they are 
hypertensive 
ASTHMA 
 
Whether the individual has ever been told that they had asthma 
AMBULASTHMA Whether the individual has gone the ER or Urgent Care because 
of an asthma attack in the last 12 months 
 
DIABETES 
 
Whether the individual has ever been told that they had diabetes 
BRONCH 
 
Whether the individual has ever been told that they had bronchitis 
HEARTDIS 
 
 
Whether the individual has ever been told that they had a heart 
attack, heart disease, or angina 
STROKE 
 
 
Whether the individual has ever been told that they had a stroke, 
to control for a chronic condition 
CANCER 
 
 
Whether the individual has ever been told that they had cancer, to 
control for a chronic condition 
USLOCER 
 
Whether the usual location of health care is a Emergency Room 
USLOCCLI 
 
Whether the usual location of health care is a clinic 
USLOCOFF 
 
Whether the usual location of health care is a doctor’s office 
USLOCOUT Whether the usual location of health care is a hospital outpatient 
clinic or urgent care center 
 
CAREDYLDCOST Whether health care was delayed because of cost 
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NEEDCARECOST 
 
Whether needed health care was not received because of cost 
NOTAFFRX Whether prescriptions were not filled because they could not 
afford it 
 
HOSPNIGHT 
 
Whether a family member was hospitalized overnight, not 
including overnight stays in the emergency room in the last 12 
months 
 
FREQHOSPN Number of days a family member was hospitalized overnight in 
the last 365 days 
 
SURGERY Whether the individual had surgery in the last 12 months 
 
FREQSRG Number of surgeries in the last 12 months 
 
FREQER Number of visits to the ER (for themselves) in the last 12 months 
 
FREQDR Number of visits to a doctor’s office, clinic, or other (not 
including overnight hospitalizations, visits to the ER, home visits, 
dental visits, or phone calls) in the last 12 months 
 
PLUS10DR Whether the individual has received care 10 or more times in the 
past 12 months 
 
NURSEPA Whether a nurse practitioner, physician assistant, or midwife has 
been seen in the last 12 months 
 
GENERALMD Whether a general doctor (general practice, family medicine, or 
internal medicine) has been seen in the last 12 months 
 
SPECIALIST Whether a medical doctor who specializes in a particular medical 
disease or problem as been seen in the last 12 months 
 
PRIVPREMIUM The dollar amount of the premium for private insurance plans 
 
AMNTSPENTHC The amount of money spent out of pocket by a family on health 
care in the last 12 months 
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X. Appendix 2: Means and Standard Deviations of the Full and Measured Sample 
 
 Full Sample Measured Sample 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
INCLESS20k 0.199 0.0399 0.240 0.427 
INCLESS45k 0.5212 0.500 0.565 0.496 
INCLESS75k 0.734 0.442 0.770 0.421 
NORTHEAST 0.173 0.378 0.181 0.385 
MIDWEST 0.202 0.401 0.225 0.418 
SOUTH 0.370 0.483 0.371 0.483 
WEST 0.255 0.436 0.223 0.146 
BLACK 0.160 0.366 0.169 0.375 
HISPANIC 0.236 0.425 0.144 0.351 
ASIAN 0.063 0.244 0.053 0.225 
AGE2 1720.207 1766.333 2704.190 1868.221 
AGEPERCENT 0.351 0.222 0.488 0.180 
FEMALE 0.517 0.500 0.588 0.492 
MARRIED 0.527 0.500 0.486 0.500 
EXCELLENT 0.344 0.475 0.265 0.441 
VERYGOOD 0.300 0.458 0.311 0.463 
GOOD 0.256 0.437 0.272 0.445 
FAIR 0.076 .0265 0.113 0.317 
POOR 0.023 0.150 0.039 0.194 
CAREDYLDCOST 0.075 0.263 0.087 0.281 
NEEDCARECOST 0.057 0.231 0.065 0.247 
NOTAFFRX 0.089 0.284 0.076 0.266 
HOSPNIGHT 0.079 0.269 0.112 0.136 
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 Full Sample Measured Sample 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev 
BORNUSA 0.816 0.388 0.837 0.369 
NOHS 0.236 0.425 0.067 0.249 
HSGRAD 0.626 0.484 0.821 0.383 
SOMECOL 0.397 0.489 0.543 0.498 
ASSOCBA 0.253 0.435 0.351 0.477 
GRADDEG 0.060 0.237 0.086 0.281 
VACCINEPNU 0.181 0.385 0.204 0.403 
VACCINEHEPB 0.265 0.441 0.267 0.442 
AMBUL 0.428 0.495 0.467 0.500 
HYPERTEN 0.290 0.454 0.325 0.468 
ASTHMA 0.111 0.312 0.117 0.321 
DIABETES 0.087 0.281 0.097 0.296 
BRONCH 0.045 0.207 0.049 0.216 
HEARTDIS 0.115 0.319 0.129 0.335 
STROKE 0.029 0.169 0.034 0.180 
CANCER 0.072 0.258 0.081 0.272 
USLOCER 0.012 0.109 0.012 0.109 
USLOCCLI 0.183 0.387 0.183 0.387 
USLOCOFF 0.771 0.420 0.771 0.420 
USLOCOUT 0.016 0.127 0.016 0.127 
NOINS 0.171 0.377 .102 0.302 
MCARE 0.122 0.327 0.240 0.427 
MCAID 0.129 0.335 0.099 0.298 
SINGSERV 0.242 0.428 0.271 0.444 
PRIV 0.604 0.489 0.676 0.468 
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 Full Sample Measured Sample 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
PRIVHMOIPA 0.294 0.456 0.292 0.455 
PRIVPPOPOS 0.491 0.500 0.494 0.500 
PRIVFFS 0.024 0.154 0.036 0.186 
PRIVDRCH 0.421 0.494 0.465 0.499 
OTHGOVINS 0.017 0.129 0.018 0.132 
MILITINS 0.029 0.168 0.039 0.194 
FREQER 0.106 0.481 0.352 0.829 
FREQDR 0.786 1.720 2.747 2.258 
PLUS10DR 0.090 0.286 0.150 0.357 
NURSEPA 0.141 0.348 0.156 0.363 
GENERALMD 0.659 0.474 0.735 0.441 
SPECIALIST 0.254 0.435 0.286 0.451 
PRIVPREMIUM 3061.237 2884.580 2668.221 2680.033 
AMNTSPENTHC 1.706 1.215 1.666 1.181 
AMBULASTHMA 0.003 0.057 0.011 0.104 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United 
States, and education 
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XI. Appendix 3: Summary Tables of Regression Outputs 
 
Table 1.  Effect of insurance on the amount spent out of pocket on health care. 
Level of 
Out of 
Pocket 
Spending 
Medicare 
Marginal 
Effects 
(Standard 
Error) 
Medicaid 
Marginal 
Effects 
(Standard 
Error) 
Private 
Insurance 
Marginal 
Effects 
(Standard 
Error) 
Other 
Government 
Insurance 
Marginal 
Effects 
(Standard 
Error) 
Military 
Insurance 
Marginal 
Effects 
(Standard 
Error) 
Zero 
 
-0.010 (0.006)** 0.107 (0.008)* -0.001 (0.004) 0.069 (0.015)* 0.071 (0.011)* 
Less than 
$500 
-0.012 (0.008)** 0.071 (0.003)* -0.002 (0.004) 0.053 (0.007)* 0.055 (0.005)* 
$500 - 
$1,999 
0.010 (0.006)** -0.098 (0.007)* 0.001 (0.004) -0.065 (0.013)* -0.068 (0.010)* 
$2,000 - 
$2,999 
0.005 (0.003)** -0.037 (0.002)* 0.001 (0.002) -0.025 (0.004)* -0.026 (0.003)* 
$3,000 - 
$4,999 
0.004 (0.002)** -0.024 (0.001)* 0.001 (0.001) -0.017 (0.003)* -0.018 (0.002)* 
$5,000 or 
more 
0.004 (0.002)** -0.020 (0.001)* 0.001 (0.001) -0.014 (0.002)* -0.015 (0.001)* 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 2. Effect of insurance on variables indicating basic care provision. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and 
Income Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Care Delayed 
because of 
Cost 
Medicare -0.032* 0.004 -0.055* 0.005 -0.064* 0.005 
Medicaid -0.050* 0.002 -0.067* 0.003 -0.077* 0.003 
Private -0.139* 0.003 -0.142* 0.005 -0.129* 0.006 
Other Gov’t Ins. -0.037* 0.004 -0.050* 0.005 -0.057* 0.006 
Military Ins. -0.057* 0.002 -0.065* 0.003 -0.070* 0.004 
N  56,706  23,723  19,472 
Needed Care 
not obtained 
because of 
Cost 
Medicare -0.022* 0.003 -0.040* 0.004 -0.046* 0.004 
Medicaid -0.037* 0.001 -0.047* 0.002 -0.053* 0.002 
Private -0.125* 0.003 -0.122* 0.005 -0.106* 0.005 
Other Gov’t Ins. -0.027* 0.003 -0.035* 0.003 -0.040* 0.003 
Military Ins. -0.040* 0.002 -0.043* 0.002 -0.046* 0.003 
N  56,695  23,721  19,473 
Cannot 
Afford 
Prescriptions 
Medicare -0.011 0.006 -0.029* 0.005 -0.033* 0.005 
Medicaid -0.036* 0.003 -0.045* 0.002 -0.049* 0.003 
Private -0.132* 0.005 -0.115* 0.005 -0.101* 0.005 
Other Gov’t Ins. -0.033* 0.006 -0.037* 0.005 -0.040* 0.005 
Military Ins. -0.057* 0.003 -0.051* 0.002 -0.053* 0.003 
 N  23,681  23,538  19,360 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 3. Effect of insurance on whether vaccines were received. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Received 
Pneumonia 
Vaccine 
Medicare 0.191* 0.012 0.165* 0.012 0.165* 0.013 
Medicaid 0.062* 0.011 0.030* 0.011 0.033* 0.011 
Private 0.030* 0.006 0.032* 0.006 0.026* 0.007 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.067* .0025 0.047* 0.024 0.041** 0.024 
Military Ins. 0.127* 0.017 0.110* 0.017 0.108* 0.019 
N  23,060  22,921  18,903 
Received 
Hepatitis B 
Vaccine 
Medicare 0.028* 0.014 0.021 0.014 0.029** 0.016 
Medicaid 0.060* 0.013 0.051* 0.013 0.049* 0.014 
Private 0.045* 0.008 0.045* 0.008 0.040* 0.009 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.092* 0.027 0.082* 0.027 0.088* 0.029 
Military Ins. 0.212* 0.021 0.208* 0.021 0.199* 0.023 
 N  22,591  22,460  18,543 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 4. Effect of insurance on utilization of overnight hospitalizations and surgery. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Whether they 
were hospitalized 
overnight 
Medicare 0.075* 0.006 0.044* 0.008 0.048* 0.009 
Medicaid 0.087* 0.006 0.066* 0.009 0.066* 0.010 
Private -0.001 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.005 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.036* 0.011 0.036* 0.017 0.025 0.018 
Military Ins. 0.022* 0.007 0.023* 0.011 0.031* 0.013 
N  56,677  23,719  19,468 
Frequency of 
overnight 
hospitalizations 
Medicare 1.195* 0.092 0.709* 0.124 0.765* 0.140 
Medicaid 0.976* 0.078 0.682* 0.115 0.671* 0.126 
Private -0.070 0.050 0.087 0.074 0.148 0.086 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.412* 0.165 0.221 0.236 0.268 0.251 
Military Ins. 0.248* 0.114 0.104 0.165 0.235 0.185 
N  56,619  23,698  19,454 
Whether they 
had surgery 
Medicare 0.060* 0.010 0.037* 0.009 0.040* 0.010 
Medicaid 0.095* 0.011 0.065* 0.010 0.065* 0.011 
Private 0.034* 0.005 0.036* 0.005 0.038* 0.006 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.086* 0.023 0.065* 0.022 0.055* 0.023 
Military Ins. 0.055* 0.014 0.039* 0.013 0.054* 0.015 
N  23,643  23,500  19,340 
Frequency of 
Surgery 
Medicare 0.133* 0.014 0.094* 0.014 0.100* 0.015 
Medicaid 0.145* 0.013 0.101* 0.013 0.100* 0.014 
Private 0.040* 0.008 0.046* 0.008 0.050* 0.009 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.108* 0.027 0.082* 0.027 0.073* 0.027 
Military Ins. 0.071* 0.019 0.048* 0.019 0.070* 0.020 
N  23,636  23,494  19,338 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
72 
Table 5. Effect of insurance on frequency of ER and doctor’s visits, and presence of ambulatory care conditions. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Frequency of 
ER visits 
Medicare 0.169* 0.022 0.057* 0.022 0.066* 0.024 
Medicaid 0.364* 0.020 0.225* 0.020 0.224* 0.021 
Private -0.044* 0.013 -0.017 0.013 -0.021 0.015 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.182* 0.042 0.119* 0.041 0.100* 0.044 
Military Ins. 0.077* 0.029 0.037 0.029 0.028 0.032 
N  23,623  23,482  19,331 
Frequency of 
Doctor’s visits 
Medicare 1.137* 0.059 0.741* 0.056 0.813* 0.062 
Medicaid 1.644* 0.054 1.171* 0.051 1.161* 0.056 
Private 0.529* 0.035 0.608* 0.033 0.590* 0.038 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.999* 0.112 0.704* 0.106 0.642* 0.113 
Military Ins. 1.021* 0.078 0.833* 0.074 0.864* 0.082 
N  23,471  23,336  19,252 
Whether there 
were 10 or 
more doctor’s 
visits 
Medicare 0.106* 0.007 0.055* 0.009 0.065* 0.010 
Medicaid 0.154* 0.008 0.099* 0.010 0.101* 0.011 
Private 0.015* 0.003 0.032* 0.005 0.031* 0.006 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.103* 0.015 0.061* 0.020 0.058* 0.022 
Military Ins. 0.063* 0.009 0.061* 0.014 0.064* 0.017 
N  56,601  23,699  19,451 
Presence of an 
Ambulatory 
care condition 
Medicare 0.128* 0.015 0.072* 0.015 0.063* 0.017 
Medicaid 0.191* 0.013 0.126* 0.014 0.123* 0.016 
Private 0.016 0.009 0.047* 0.009 0.050* 0.010 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.120* 0.028 0.082* 0.029 0.071* 0.031 
Military Ins. 0.125* 0.020 0.118* 0.021 0.129* 0.023 
N  23,774  23,734  19,478 
Whether a visit 
to the ER was 
due to asthma 
Medicare 0.047 0.053 0.024 0.052 0.007 0.055 
Medicaid 0.043 0.043 0.017 0.043 0.022 0.045 
Private -0.015 0.039 0.001 0.039 -0.002 0.044 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.153 0.106 0.138 0.106 0.134 0.112 
Military Ins. 0.125 0.094 0.127 0.095 0.136 0.102 
 N  935  935  943 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 6. Effect of insurance on type of care received and overall spending. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Whether a 
Nurse or PA 
was seen 
Medicare 0.045* 0.010 0.017** 0.009 0.029* 0.011 
Medicaid 0.078* 0.011 0.041* 0.010 0.040* 0.011 
Private 0.019* 0.006 0.024* 0.006 0.022* 0.006 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.073* 0.022 0.046* 0.021 0.047* 0.022 
Military Ins. 0.127* 0.016 0.110* 0.016 0.127* 0.018 
N  23,611  23,471  19,328 
Whether a 
General MD 
was seen 
Medicare 0.145* 0.012 0.114* 0.013 0.124* 0.014 
Medicaid 0.191* 0.009 0.159* 0.010 0.175* 0.010 
Private 0.182* 0.008 0.192* 0.008 0.177* 0.010 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.198* 0.016 0.181* 0.017 0.188* 0.017 
Military Ins. 0.182* 0.013 0.166* 0.014 0.161* 0.015 
N  23,620  23,476  19,331 
Whether a 
Specialist was 
seen 
Medicare 0.158* 0.013 0.105* 0.013 0.125* 0.014 
Medicaid 0.159* 0.014 0.084* 0.013 0.089* 0.014 
Private 0.088* 0.007 0.101* 0.007 0.101* 0.008 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.139* 0.028 0.097* 0.027 0.095* 0.029 
Military Ins. 0.139* 0.018 0.115* 0.018 0.129* 0.021 
N  23,616  23,475  19,332 
Amount Spent 
on Health 
Care 
Medicare 0.013 0.023 -0.036 0.031 0.038 0.034 
Medicaid -0.410* 0.020 -0.472* 0.029 -0.408* 0.031 
Private 0.115* 0.013 0.082* 0.019 -0.024 0.021 
Other Gov’t Ins. -0.202* 0.042 -0.279* 0.059 -0.264* 0.061 
Military Ins. -0.263* 0.029 -0.284* 0.041 -0.313* 0.045 
N  54,488  23,169  19,236 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 7. Effect of insurance on the usual location of health care consumption. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Usual location 
of care is ER 
Medicare -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Medicaid -0.004* 0.001 -0.004* 0.001 -0.004* 0.001 
Private -0.018* 0.002 -0.017* 0.002 -0.015* 0.002 
Other Gov’t Ins. -0.003* 0.001 -0.003* 0.001 -0.004* 0.001 
Military Ins. -0.003* 0.001 -0.003* 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
N  19,987  19,862  16,194 
Usual location 
of care is a 
free clinic 
Medicare -0.025* 0.010 -0.027* 0.010 -0.038* 0.011 
Medicaid 0.018 0.010 0.015 0.010 -0.002 0.011 
Private -0.123* 0.008 -0.122* 0.008 -0.110* 0.009 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.101* 0.024 0.100* 0.024 0.108* 0.026 
Military Ins. 0.096* 0.017 0.091* 0.017 0.120* 0.020 
N  19,987  19,862  16,194 
Usual location 
of care is a 
doctor’s office 
Medicare 0.036* 0.011 0.040* 0.011 0.056* 0.012 
Medicaid 0.019 0.010 0.024* 0.010 0.046* 0.011 
Private 0.195* 0.009 0.194* 0.009 0.181* 0.010 
Other Gov’t Ins. -0.076* 0.024 -0.076* 0.024 -0.067* 0.026 
Military Ins. -0.178* 0.019 -0.174* 0.019 -0.197* 0.022 
N  19,987  19,862  16,194 
Usual location 
of care is an 
outpatient 
clinic 
Medicare 0.0005 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.00004 0.003 
Medicaid 0.0002 0.002 -0.0003 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
Private -0.011* 0.002 -0.010* 0.002 -0.011* 0.002 
Other Gov’t Ins. 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.0002 0.004 
Military Ins. 0.066* 0.011 0.066* 0.011 0.067* 0.012 
N  19,987  19,862  16,194 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 8. Effect of insurance on basic care provision for the privately insured relative to those with private HMOs or IPAs. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and 
Income Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Care Delayed 
because of 
Cost 
Other Private Ins. 0.018* 0.004 0.027* 0.007 0.194* 0.060 
Private PPO or POS 0.017* 0.003 0.019* 0.004 0.186* 0.048 
Private FFS 0.020* 0.010 0.019* 0.015 0.048 0.130 
Dr. of Choice -0.007* 0.002 -0.013* 0.004 -0.112* 0.041 
N  35,697  14,833  11,930 
Needed Care 
not obtained 
because of 
Cost 
Other Private Ins. 0.014* 0.003 0.017* 0.005 0.012* 0.005 
Private PPO or POS 0.010* 0.002 0.010* 0.003 0.011* 0.003 
Private FFS 0.034* 0.010 0.026* 0.014 0.015 0.012 
Dr. of Choice -0.009* 0.002 -0.010* 0.003 -0.010* 0.003 
N  35,693  14,834  11.931 
Cannot 
Afford 
Prescriptions 
Other Private Ins. 0.030* 0.006 0.023* 0.006 0.015* 0.006 
Private PPO or POS 0.010* 0.004 0.010* 0.003 0.010* 0.004 
Private FFS 0.020** 0.014 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.012 
Dr. of Choice -0.009* 0.003 -0.006* 0.003 -0.005** 0.003 
 N  14,805  14,726  11,875 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 9. Effect of insurance on vaccinations for the privately insured relative to those with private HMOs or IPAs. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Received 
Pneumonia 
Vaccine 
Other Private Ins. 0.016 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.007 0.011 
Private PPO or POS -0.010 0.008 -0.010 0.008 -0.007 0.008 
Private FFS 0.014 0.017 0.010 0.017 -0.005 0.017 
Dr. of Choice 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.007 
N  14,412  14,335  11,596 
Received 
Hepatitis B 
Vaccine 
Other Private Ins. 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.0003 0.014 
Private PPO or POS -0.004 0.010 -0.005 0.010 -0.016 0.011 
Private FFS -0.015 0.024 -0.016 0.024 -0.022 0.009 
Dr. of Choice -0.009 0.008 -0.008 0.008 -0.004 0.017 
 N  14,124  14,052  11,379 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 10. Effect of insurance on utilization of overnight hospitalizations and surgery for the privately insured relative to those 
with private HMOs or IPAs. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Whether they 
were hospitalized 
overnight 
Other Private Ins. 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.008 
Private PPO or POS 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 
Private FFS 0.009* 0.009 0.001 0.012 0.002 0.013 
Dr. of Choice 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.005 
N  35,664  14,829  11,925 
Frequency of 
overnight 
hospitalizations 
Other Private Ins. 0.060 0.052 0.063 0.105 0.114 0.127 
Private PPO or POS 0.069 0.042 0.127 0.083 0.129 0.098 
Private FFS 0.313* 0.111 0.039 0.197 0.063 0.235 
Dr. of Choice 0.006 0.037 0.063 0.072 0.080 0.086 
N  35,638  14,822  11,922 
Whether they 
had surgery 
Other Private Ins. 0.001 0.009 -0.003 0.009 0.003 0.010 
Private PPO or POS 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 
Private FFS -0.022 0.014 -0.025** 0.014 -0.036* 0.015 
Dr. of Choice 0.014* 0.006 0.014* 0.006 0.015* 0.007 
N  14,770  14,691  11,857 
Frequency of 
Surgery 
Other Private Ins. 0.002 0.013 -0.004 0.013 0.004 0.014 
Private PPO or POS 0.002 0.010 0.001 0.010 -0.003 0.014 
Private FFS -0.025 0.024 -0.031 0.024 -0.058* 0.027 
Dr. of Choice 0.015** 0.009 0.016** 0.009 0.022* 0.010 
 N  14,764  14,686  11,856 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 11. The effect of insurance on frequency of ER and doctor’s visits and presence of ambulatory care conditions for the 
privately insured relative to those with private HMOs or IPAs. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and 
Income Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Frequency of 
ER visits 
Other Private Ins. 0.009 0.018 -0.005 0.018 -0.006 0.020 
Private PPO or POS 0.0004 0.014 -0.001 0.014 0.002 0.016 
Private FFS -0.036 0.034 -0.048 0.033 -0.042 0.037 
Dr. of Choice 0.029* 0.013 0.036* 0.012 0.037* 0.014 
N  14,685  14,763  11,854 
Frequency of 
Doctor’s visits 
Other Private Ins. 0.088 0.054 0.027 0.051 0.020 0.058 
Private PPO or POS 0.178* 0.043 0.169* 0.041 0.170* 0.045 
Private FFS 0.129 0.102 0.088 0.096 0.022 0.108 
Dr. of Choice 0.017 0.038 0.040 0.035 0.072** 0.040 
N  14,672  14,598  11,816 
Whether there 
were 10 or 
more doctor’s 
visits 
Other Private Ins. 0.010* 0.005 0.017* 0.008 0.013 0.010 
Private PPO or POS 0.021* 0.004 0.026* 0.006 0.025* 0.007 
Private FFS 0.023* 0.010 0.025** 0.016 0.011 0.017 
Dr. of Choice 0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.005 0.002 0.006 
N  35,621  14,820  11,918 
Presence of an 
Ambulatory 
care condition 
Other Private Ins. 0.026 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.033* 0.016 
Private PPO or POS 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.026* 0.012 
Private FFS -0.003 0.026 -0.012 0.026 -0.004 0.030 
Dr. of Choice -0.015 0.009 -0.009 0.010 -0.006 0.011 
N  14,839  14,857  11,933 
Whether a 
visit to the ER 
was due to 
asthma 
Other Private Ins. -0.057 0.051 -0.089** 0.047 -0.103** 0.047 
Private PPO or POS -0.056 0.047 -0.070 0.047 -0.061 0.050 
Private FFS -0.087 0.074 -0.093 0.069 -0.100 0.068 
Dr. of Choice 0.083* 0.042 0.096* 0.042 0.082** 0.044 
 N  482  482  425 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 12. Effect of insurance on type of care received and overall spending for the privately insured relative to those with 
private HMOs or IPAs. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Whether a 
Nurse or PA 
was seen 
Other Private Ins. 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.011 
Private PPO or POS 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.0002 0.009 
Private FFS -0.020 0.016 -0.020 0.016 -0.025 0.018 
Dr. of Choice -0.008 0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.002 0.007 
N  14,752  14,675  11,849 
Whether a 
General MD 
was seen 
Other Private Ins. -0.003 0.012 -0.009 0.012 -0.004 0.014 
Private PPO or POS 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.009 -0.007 0.010 
Private FFS -0.053* 0.025 -0.054* 0.026 -0.047** 0.028 
Dr. of Choice 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.009 
N  14,754  14,675  11,850 
Whether a 
Specialist was 
seen 
Other Private Ins. 0.005 0.012 -0.003 0.012 0.004 0.014 
Private PPO or POS 0.028* 0.010 0.027* 0.010 0.031* 0.011 
Private FFS 0.032 0.022 0.026 0.023 0.026 0.025 
Dr. of Choice 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.009 
N  14,753  14,676  11,849 
Amount Spent 
on Health 
Care 
Other Private Ins. 0.048* 0.020 0.036 0.029 0.070* 0.032 
Private PPO or POS 0.233* 0.016 0.198* 0.023 0.186* 0.025 
Private FFS 0.115* 0.041 0.067 0.055 0.050 0.060 
Dr. of Choice 0.055* 0.014 0.058* 0.020 0.079* 0.022 
N  34,249  14,504  11,798 
Private 
Premium 
Other Private Ins. -217.135* 69.358 -168.744** 93.226 -97.592 100.280 
Private PPO or POS 80.569 49.397 43.694 68.313 36.256 72.312 
Private FFS -209.033** 122.167 -46.459 157.882 54.683 170.921 
Dr. of Choice 262.589* 43.935 237.444* 60.449 204.430* 64.395 
N  19,711  8,800  7,497 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 13. Effect of insurance on the usual location of health care for the privately insured relative to those with private HMOs 
or IPAs. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Usual location 
of care is ER 
Other Private Ins. 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002** 0.001 
Private PPO or POS 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Private FFS 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003 
Dr. of Choice 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 
N  13,553  13,481  10,802 
Usual location 
of care is a 
free clinic 
Other Private Ins. 0.052* 0.010 0.052* 0.010 0.056* 0.012 
Private PPO or POS -0.015* 0.007 -0.014** 0.007 -0.016* 0.008 
Private FFS 0.003 0.017 -0.0001 0.017 -0.007 0.018 
Dr. of Choice 0.011** 0.006 0.011** 0.006 0.017* 0.007 
N  13,553  13,481  10,802 
Usual location 
of care is a 
doctor’s office 
Other Private Ins. -0.069* 0.011 -0.069* 0.011 -0.068* 0.013 
Private PPO or POS 0.012 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.017** 0.009 
Private FFS -0.003 0.019 -0.0001 0.018 0.007 0.020 
Dr. of Choice -0.016* 0.012 -0.016* 0.007 -0.024* 0.008 
N  13,553  13,481  10,802 
Usual location 
of care is an 
outpatient 
clinic 
Other Private Ins. 0.00004 0.002 -0.00002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
Private PPO or POS -0.003* 0.001 -0.003* 0.001 -0.003* 0.002 
Private FFS -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
Dr. of Choice 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.003* 0.001 
N  13,553  13,481  10,802 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 14. Effect of insurance on basic care provision for the privately insured relative to those with private HMOs or IPAs 
without other private insurance. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and 
Income Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Care Delayed 
because of Cost 
Private PPO or POS 0.017* 0.003 0.017* 0.004 0.018* 0.005 
Private FFS 0.023* 0.010 0.018 0.015 0.005 0.014 
Dr. of Choice -0.009* 0.002 -0.012* 0.004 -0.011* 0.004 
N  28,979  12,145  9,866 
Needed Care 
not obtained 
because of Cost 
Private PPO or POS 0.010* 0.002 0.010* 0.003 0.011* 0.003 
Private FFS 0.040* 0.011 0.030* 0.014 0.019** 0.013 
Dr. of Choice -0.011* 0.002 -0.011* 0.003 -0.011* 0.003 
N  28,975  12,145  9,866 
Cannot Afford 
Prescriptions 
Private PPO or POS 0.010* 0.004 0.009* 0.004 0.009* 0.003 
Private FFS 0.020** 0.013 0.016 0.002 0.013 0.012 
Dr. of Choice -0.009* 0.003 -0.006* 0.003 -0.006** 0.003 
N  12,113  12,054  9,820 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 15. Effect of insurance on vaccinations for the privately insured relative to those with private HMOs or IPAs without 
other private insurance. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Received 
Pneumonia 
Vaccine 
Private PPO or POS -0.005 0.008 -0.006 0.007 -0.003 0.008 
Private FFS 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.002 0.017 
Dr. of Choice 0.0002 0.007 0.003 0.007 -0.001 0.008 
N  11,814  11,757  9,602 
Received 
Hepatitis B 
Vaccine 
Private PPO or POS -0.006 0.010 -0.006 0.010 -0.018 0.011 
Private FFS -0.023 0.025 -0.024 0.025 -0.030 0.027 
Dr. of Choice -0.008 0.009 -0.007 0.009 -0.002 0.010 
 N  11,596  11,543  9,436 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 16. Effect of insurance on utilization of overnight hospitalizations and surgery for the privately insured relative to those 
with private HMOs or IPAs without other private insurance. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and 
Income Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Whether they 
were hospitalized 
overnight 
Private PPO or POS 0.006** 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 
Private FFS 0.018* 0.009 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.013 
Dr. of Choice 0.001 0.003 0.006* 0.005 0.009 0.006 
N  28,969  12,140  9,860 
Frequency of 
overnight 
hospitalizations 
Private PPO or POS 0.074** 0.041 0.126 0.079 0.134 0.091 
Private FFS 0.351* 0.017 0.099 0.188 0.136 0.009 
Dr. of Choice -0.004 0.039 0.070 0.075 0.081 0.081 
N  28,953  12,135  9,858 
Whether they 
had surgery 
Private PPO or POS 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 
Private FFS -0.024 0.014 -0.026** 0.014 -0.038* 0.014 
Dr. of Choice 0.016* 0.007 0.017* 0.007 0.020* 0.007 
N  12,084  12,026  9,806 
Frequency of 
Surgery 
Private PPO or POS 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.010 -0.0005 0.010 
Private FFS -0.023 0.024 -0.029 0.024 -0.058* 0.026 
Dr. of Choice 0.016** 0.010 0.017** 0.017 0.023* 0.010 
N  12,080  12,023  9,805 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 17. Effect of insurance on frequency of ER and doctor’s visits and presence of ambulatory care conditions for the 
privately insured relative to those with private HMOs or IPAs without other private insurance. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and 
Income Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Frequency of 
ER visits 
Private PPO or POS -0.0004 0.015 -0.002 0.014 0.005 0.016 
Private FFS -0.037 0.035 -0.047 0.034 -0.038 0.038 
Dr. of Choice 0.033* 0.014 0.038 0.014 0.038* 0.015 
N  12,082  12,023  9,838 
Frequency of 
Doctor’s visits 
Private PPO or POS 0.204* 0.043 0.190* 0.041 0.202* 0.046 
Private FFS 0.186** 0.104 0.145 0.098 0.083 0.110 
Dr. of Choice -0.022 0.042 0.007 0.039 0.023 0.044 
N  12,032  11,978  9,781 
Whether there 
were 10 or 
more doctor’s 
visits 
Private PPO or POS 0.022* 0.010 0.025* 0.006 0.024* 0.007 
Private FFS 0.026* 0.012 0.025** 0.016 0.014 0.017 
Dr. of Choice 0.000001 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.007 
N  28,938  12,133  9,856 
Presence of an 
Ambulatory 
care condition 
Private PPO or POS 0.022* 0.011 0.022* 0.011 0.032* 0.012 
Private FFS 0.009 0.026 0.003 0.027 0.007 0.030 
Dr. of Choice -0.026* 0.010 -0.021* 0.010 -0.016 0.012 
N  12,157  12,148  9,867 
Whether a 
visit to the ER 
was due to 
asthma 
Private PPO or POS -0.072 0.051 -0.087** 0.051 -0.074 0.055 
Private FFS -0.070 0.081 -0.083 0.074 -0.087 0.075 
Dr. of Choice 0.097* 0.048 0.104* 0.048 0.081** 0.050 
N  395  395  346 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 18. Effect of insurance on type of care received and overall spending for the privately insured relative to those with 
private HMOs or IPAs without other private insurance. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Whether a 
Nurse or PA 
was seen 
Private PPO or POS 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.008 
Private FFS -0.019 0.016 -0.019 0.016 -0.022 0.018 
Dr. of Choice -0.011 0.007 -0.008 0.007 -0.007 0.008 
N  12,077  12,020  9,803 
Whether a 
General MD 
was seen 
Private PPO or POS 0.006 0.010 0.003 0.010 -0.004 0.011 
Private FFS -0.039 0.025 -0.041 0.026 -0.037 0.028 
Dr. of Choice 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 
N  12,079  12,021  9,804 
Whether a 
Specialist was 
seen 
Private PPO or POS 0.027* 0.010 0.027* 0.010 0.030* 0.011 
Private FFS 0.032 0.023 0.026 0.023 0.031 0.026 
Dr. of Choice 0.014 0.009 0.017** 0.009 0.016 0.010 
N  12,077  12,020  9,804 
Amount Spent 
on Health 
Care 
Private PPO or POS 0.239* 0.016 0.205* 0.023 0.188* 0.025 
Private FFS 0.124* 0.042 0.092** 0.055 0.059 0.061 
Dr. of Choice 0.046* 0.015 0.044* 0.022 0.075* 0.024 
N  28,222  11,943  9,779 
Private 
Premium 
Private PPO or POS 92.900** 50.487 51.202 70.203 38.030 73.861 
Private FFS -198.809 125.3749 -15.175 163.331 65.311 175.366 
Dr. of Choice 250.4628* 47.781 227.246* 66.345 210.070* 70.140 
N  16,983  7,461  6,393 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 19. Effect of insurance on the usual location of health care for the privately insured relative to those with private HMOs 
or IPAs without other private insurance. 
Variable  Without Health Status and 
Income 
With Health Status Added With Health Status and Income 
Added 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Usual location 
of care is ER 
Private PPO or POS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Private FFS 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Dr. of Choice 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0005 0.0006 
N  11,165  10,738  8,703 
Usual location 
of care is a free 
clinic 
Private PPO or POS -0.015* 0.007 -0.014* 0.007 -0.015** 0.008 
Private FFS -0.010 0.015 -0.013 0.015 -0.016 0.016 
Dr. of Choice 0.013* 0.007 0.014* 0.007 0.017* 0.008 
N  11,165  11,110  8,992 
Usual location 
of care is a 
doctor’s office 
Private PPO or POS 0.015** 0.008 0.013** 0.008 0.017* 0.009 
Private FFS 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.018 
Dr. of Choice -0.022* 0.007 -0.023* 0.007 -0.027* 0.008 
N  11,165  11,110  8,992 
Usual location 
of care is an 
outpatient clinic 
Private PPO or POS -0.003* 0.001 -0.003* 0.001 -0.003* 0.002 
Private FFS -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
Dr. of Choice 0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.001 
N  11,165  11,110  8,992 
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 leve
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XII. Appendix 4: Complete Set of Regression Outputs Including Controls 
 
Table 20. Correlation coefficients for care delayed due to cost and not getting needed 
care due to cost. 
 CAREDLYDCOST NEEDCARECOST 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE -0.064* 0.005 -0.046* 0.004 
MEDICAID -0.076* 0.003 -0.053* 0.002 
PRIVATE -0.128* 0.006 -0.106* 0.005 
OTHER GOV’T INS -0.057* 0.006 -0.040* 0.004 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
-0.070* 0.004 -0.046* 0.003 
INCLESS20k 0.113* 0.011 0.102* 0.010 
INC. Between 20k-45k 0.095* 0.009 0.078* 0.009 
INC. Between 45k-75k 0.048* 0.009 0.035* 0.008 
MIDWEST 0.0.019* 0.007 0.007 0.006 
SOUTH 0.012 0.006 0.009* 0.005 
WEST 0.019* 0.007 0.005 0.005 
FEMALE 0.020* 0.004 0.011* 0.003 
BLACK -0.031* 0.004 -0.012* 0.004 
HISPANIC -0.034* 0.005 -0.021* 0.004 
ASIAN -0.056* 0.006 -0.032* 0.005 
AGE2 -0.0001* 0.00001 -0.0001* 0.00001 
AGEPERCENT 0. 661* 0.071 0.541* 0.056 
MARRIED -0.033* 0.004 -0.018* 0.003 
GOOD 0.049* 0.006 0.041* 0.005 
FAIR 0.137* 0.011 0.129* 0.010 
POOR 0.225* 0.021 0.230* 0.021 
BORNUSA 0.022* 0.006 0.014* 0.005 
HSGRAD 0.015* 0.006 0.001 0.004 
SOMECOL 0.051* 0.008 0.026* 0.006 
ASSOCBA 0.051* 0.008 0.027* 0.006 
GRADDEG 0.059* 0.014 0.011 0.010 
STROKE 0.021 0.013 0.019 0.011 
CANCER 0.014 0.009 0.019* 0.008 
N 19,548  19,549  
R2 0.165  0.208  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 21. Correlation coefficients for not being able to afford prescription drugs. 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE -0.033* 0.005 
MEDICAID -0.049* 0.003 
PRIVATE -0.101* 0.005 
OTHER GOV’T INS -0.041* 0.005 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
-0.053* 0.003 
INCLESS20k 0.116* 0.011 
INC. Between 20k-45k 0.102* 0.010 
INC. Between 45k-75k 0.054* 0.010 
MIDWEST 0.015* 0.006 
SOUTH 0.015* 0.005 
WEST 0.009 0.006 
FEMALE 0.033* 0.003 
BLACK -0.001 0.004 
HISPANIC -0.010 0.005 
ASIAN -0.010 0.009 
AGE2 -0.0001* 0.00001 
AGEPERCENT 0.477* 0.059 
MARRIED -0.001 0.004 
GOOD 0.056* 0.005 
FAIR 0.134* 0.011 
POOR 0.248* 0.021 
BORNUSA 0.025* 0.005 
HSGRAD -0.008 0.005 
SOMECOL 0.018* 0.006 
ASSOCBA 0.009 0.006 
GRADDEG 0.005 0.010 
STROKE 0.024* 0.011 
CANCER 0.017* 0.008 
N 19,435  
R2 0.189  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 22.  Correlation coefficients for instance and frequency of overnight 
hospitalizations. 
 HOSPNIGHT FREQHOSPN 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE 0.052* 0.010 0.787* 0.139 
MEDICAID 0.073* 0.010 0.697* 0.126 
PRIVATE 0.011* 0.005 0.167 0.086 
OTHER GOV’T INS 0.027 0.018 0.285 0.184 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
0.031* 0.013 0.249 0.251 
INCLESS20k 0.007 0.008 0.094 0.120 
INC. Between 20k-45k 0.010 0.007 0.057 0.103 
INC. Between 45k-75k 0.010 0.007 0.129 0.103 
MIDWEST 0.002 0.007 -0.212* 0.105 
SOUTH 0.002 0.006 -0.215* 0.096 
WEST -0.012 0.006 -0.223* 0.105 
FEMALE 0.038* 0.004 0.037 0.066 
BLACK -0.008 0.005 -0.130 0.094 
HISPANIC -0.011 0.007 -0.140 0.113 
ASIAN -0.020 0.007 -0.235 0.171 
AGE2 0.00004* 0.000001 -0.00006* 0.0001 
AGEPERCENT -0.409* 0.066 -1.160 1.131 
MARRIED 0.013* 0.005 -0.013 0.074 
GOOD 0.044* 0.006 0.301* 0.078 
FAIR 0.113* 0.020 1.081* 0.114 
POOR 0.225* 0.020 3.517* 0.185 
BORNUSA 0.016* 0.007 0.075 0.111 
HSGRAD 0.001 0.006 0.123 0.100 
SOMECOL -0.005 0.007 0.086 0.111 
ASSOCBA 0.005 0.007 0.209 0.110 
GRADDEG 0.002 0.010 0.170 0.151 
STROKE 0.098* 0.016 2.358* 0.151 
CANCER 0.061* 0.009 0.821* 0.130 
N 19,543  19,529  
R2 0.102  0.056  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 23. Correlation coefficients for frequency of ER and doctor’s visits. 
 FREQER FREQDR 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE 0.076* 0.024 0.863* 0.063 
MEDICAID 0.242* 0.022 1.244* 0.057 
PRIVATE -0.015 0.015 0.622* 0.039 
OTHER GOV’T INS 0.109* 0.044 0.705* 0.114 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
0.044 0.032 0.951* 0.083 
INCLESS20k 0.023 0.021 -0.221* 0.054 
INC. Between 20k-45k 0.047* 0.018 -0.136* 0.046 
INC. Between 45k-75k 0.020 0.018 -0.054 0.047 
MIDWEST -0.036* 0.018 -0.208* 0.047 
SOUTH -0.046* 0.017 -0.263* 0.043 
WEST -0.067* 0.018 -0.245* 0.048 
FEMALE 0.061* 0.011 0.713* 0.030 
BLACK 0.041* 0.016 -0.302* 0.043 
HISPANIC -0.061* 0.020 -0.195* 0.051 
ASIAN -0.063* 0.030 -0.355* 0.077 
AGE2 0.00006* 0.00002 -0.00003 0.00006 
AGEPERCENT -1.044* 0.197 0.245 0.510 
MARRIED -0.016 0.013 0.060* 0.035 
GOOD 0.151* 0.014 0.581* 0.035 
FAIR 0.400* 0.020 1.533* 0.052 
POOR 0.871* 0.032 2.477* 0.084 
BORNUSA 0.088* 0.019 0.201* 0.050 
HSGRAD -0.029 0.017 0.115* 0.045 
SOMECOL 0.005 0.019 0.424* 0.050 
ASSOCBA -0.007 0.019 0.445* 0.050 
GRADDEG -0.047 0.026 0.535* 0.068 
STROKE 0.370* 0.035 0.742* 0.059 
CANCER 0.093* 0.023 0.857* 0.141 
N 19,405  19,325  
R2 0.106  0.225  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 24.  Correlation coefficients for more than 10 doctor’s visits. 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE 0.069* 0.011 
MEDICAID 0.110* 0.012 
PRIVATE 0.033* 0.006 
OTHER GOV’T INS 0.066* 0.022 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
0.074* 0.016 
INCLESS20k -0.011 0.008 
INC. Between 20k-45k -0.011 0.007 
INC. Between 45k-75k -0.003 0.007 
MIDWEST -0.012 0.007 
SOUTH -0.016* 0.006 
WEST -0.011 0.007 
FEMALE 0.049* 0.005 
BLACK -0.027* 0.006 
HISPANIC -0.014 0.008 
ASIAN -0.015 0.012 
AGE2 -0.00002* 0.000001 
AGEPERCENT 0.162* 0.076 
MARRIED -0.019* 0.005 
GOOD 0.085* 0.007 
FAIR 0.278* 0.013 
POOR 0.483* 0.022 
BORNUSA 0.025* 0.007 
HSGRAD 0.008 0.007 
SOMECOL 0.050* 0.009 
ASSOCBA 0.053* 0.009 
GRADDEG 0.049* 0.013 
STROKE 0.106* 0.017 
CANCER 0.073* 0.010 
N 19,527  
R2 0.169  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 25.  Correlation coefficients for instance and frequency of surgery. 
 SURGERY FREQSRG 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE 0.043* 0.011 0.104* 0.015 
MEDICAID 0.070* 0.011 0.107* 0.014 
PRIVATE 0.039* 0.006 0.052* 0.009 
OTHER GOV’T INS 0.057* 0.023 0.076* 0.027 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
0.059* 0.016 0.076* 0.020 
INCLESS20k -0.004 0.009 -0.005 0.013 
INC. Between 20k-45k 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.011 
INC. Between 45k-75k -0.0002 0.007 0.003 0.011 
MIDWEST 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.011 
SOUTH 0.006 0.007 -0.005 0.010 
WEST -0.008 0.008 -0.020 0.011 
FEMALE 0.036* 0.005 0.036* 0.001 
BLACK -0.033* 0.006 -0.062* 0.010 
HISPANIC -0.027* 0.008 -0.042* 0.012 
ASIAN -0.039* 0.011 -0.063* 0.019 
AGE2 0.000001 0.000008 -0.00003* 0.00001 
AGEPERCENT -0.007 0.079 0.203 0.123 
MARRIED 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.008 
GOOD 0.042* 0.006 0.062* 0.019 
FAIR 0.067* 0.010 0.106* 0.012 
POOR 0.129* 0.018 0.237* 0.020 
BORNUSA 0.034* 0.007 0.035 0.012 
HSGRAD 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.012 
SOMECOL 0.021* 0.009 0.042* 0.012 
ASSOCBA 0.011 0.008 0.033* 0.012 
GRADDEG 0.023* 0.012 0.041* 0.016 
STROKE 0.016 0.014 0.037 0.016 
CANCER 0.126* 0.012 0.226* 0.014 
N 19,414  19,412  
R2 0.058  0.054  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 26.  Correlation coefficients for whether a nurse or physician’s assistant 
(NURSEPA), general MD, or specialist was seen. 
 NURSEPA GENERALMD SPECIALIST 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std. 
Error 
MEDICARE 0.032* 0.011 0.130* 0.014 0.133* 0.014 
MEDICAID 0.046* 0.011 0.185* 0.010 0.100* 0.014 
PRIVATE 0.024* 0.006 0.181* 0.009 0.105* 0.008 
OTHER GOV’T 
INS 
0.053* 0.023 0.192* 0.017 0.101* 0.029 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
0.135* 0.019 0.172* 0.015 0.140* 0.021 
INCLESS20k -0.006 0.009 -0.081* 0.013 -0.048* 0.011 
INC. Between 
20k-45k 
-0.005 0.008 -0.059* 0.011 -0.047* 0.009 
INC. Between 
45k-75k 
-0.005 0.007 -0.028* 0.011 -0.027* 0.011 
MIDWEST 0.009 0.008 -0.060* 0.012 -0.030* 0.010 
SOUTH -0.025* 0.007 -0.084* 0.011 -0.018* 0.009 
WEST 0.031* 0.009 -0.078* 0.012 -0.042* 0.010 
FEMALE 0.077* 0.005 0.095* 0.007 0.019* 0.006 
BLACK -0.058* 0.006 0.021* 0.010 -0.074* 0.008 
HISPANIC -0.061* 0.007 -0.023 0.012 -0.028* 0.011 
ASIAN -0.052* 0.010 -0.050* 0.019 -0.056* 0.011 
AGE2 0.000004 0.00001 -0.00003* 0.00001 -0.00006* 0.00001 
AGEPERCENT -0.197* 0.084 0.037 0.128 0.829* 0.111 
MARRIED 0.015* 0.006 0.016 0.008 -0.007 0.007 
GOOD 0.032* 0.006 0.069* 0.008 0.108* 0.008 
FAIR 0.115* 0.011 0.122* 0.011 0.226* 0.013 
POOR 0.182* 0.021 0.177* 0.015 0.375* 0.021 
BORNUSA 0.059* 0.007 0.020 0.012 0.048* 0.010 
HSGRAD 0.026* 0.009 0.020 0.011 0.035* 0.010 
SOMECOL 0.081* 0.011 0.082* 0.011 0.095* 0.012 
ASSOCBA 0.088* 0.010 0.060* 0.011 0.094* 0.012 
GRADDEG 0.121* 0.016 0.065* 0.015 0.126* 0.017 
STROKE 0.058* 0.017 0.089* 0.023 0.109* 0.021 
CANCER 0.036* 0.010 0.081* 0.014 0.194* 0.014 
N 19,401  19,405  19,405  
R2 0.078  0.112  0.133  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
 
94 
 
94 
Table 27.  Correlation coefficients for whether the usual location of care was listed as the 
ER or a free clinic. 
 ER Free Clinic 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE -0.002 0.001 -0.038* 0.011 
MEDICAID -0.004* 0.001 -0.001 0.011 
PRIVATE -0.015* 0.002 -0.109* 0.009 
OTHER GOV’T INS -0.004* 0.001 0.107* 0.026 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
-0.003 0.001 0.123* 0.020 
INCLESS20k 0.007* 0.003 0.104* 0.013 
INC. Between 20k-45k 0.006* 0.003 0.069* 0.011 
INC. Between 45k-75k 0.001 0.002 0.025* 0.011 
MIDWEST -0.002 0.001 0.164* 0.012 
SOUTH -0.001 0.001 -0.015 0.010 
WEST -0.003* 0.001 0.089* 0.012 
FEMALE -0.003* 0.001 -0.003 0.006 
BLACK 0.008* 0.002 -0.016 0.009 
HISPANIC 0.005* 0.002 0.022* 0.011 
ASIAN -0.002 0.002 -0.023 0.015 
AGE2 0.000002 0.000002 -0.00001 0.00001 
AGEPERCENT -0.00001 0.014 -0.032 0.104 
MARRIED -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.007 
GOOD 0.001 0.001 0.019* 0.008 
FAIR 0.002 0.002 0.014 0.011 
POOR 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.016 
BORNUSA 0.002 0.001 -0.045* 0.012 
HSGRAD -0.001 0.001 -0.022* 0.009 
SOMECOL -0.002* 0.001 -0.034* 0.009 
ASSOCBA -0.002 0.001 -0.036* 0.010 
GRADDEG -0.002 0.002 -0.034* 0.013 
STROKE 0.002 0.003 -0.012 0.017 
CANCER -0.001 0.002 0.012 0.012 
N 16,258  16,258  
R2 0.177  0.088  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
 
 
 
95 
 
95 
Table 28.  Correlation coefficients for whether the usual location of care was listed as a 
doctor’s office or outpatient clinic. 
 Doctor’s Office Outpatient Clinic 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE 0.055* 0.012 -0.0002 0.003 
MEDICAID 0.045* 0.011 -0.001 0.002 
PRIVATE 0.180* 0.010 -0.011 0.002 
OTHER GOV’T INS -0.066* 0.026 -0.0004 0.004 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
-0.200* 0.022 0.066 0.012 
INCLESS20k -0.139* 0.014 0.004 0.003 
INC. Between 20k-45k -0.09* 0.012 0.002 0.003 
INC. Between 45k-75k -0.026* 0.012 0.0003 0.003 
MIDWEST -0.152* 0.012 -0.002 0.002 
SOUTH 0.031* 0.010 -0.008 0.002 
WEST -0.077* 0.012 -0.004 0.002 
FEMALE 0.034* 0.007 -0.006 0.002 
BLACK -0.001 0.010 0.013 0.003 
HISPANIC -0.011* 0.012 0.016 0.004 
ASIAN 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.007 
AGE2 0.00002 0.00001 -0.000004* 0.000002 
AGEPERCENT 0.058 0.115 0.033 0.024 
MARRIED 0.019* 0.008 -0.005 0.002 
GOOD -0.019* 0.008 0.004 0.002 
FAIR -0.022 0.012 0.006 0.003 
POOR 0.001 0.018 0.003 0.004 
BORNUSA 0.060* 0.013 -0.004 0.003 
HSGRAD 0.026* 0.010 -0.001 0.002 
SOMECOL 0.048* 0.010 -0.004 0.002 
ASSOCBA 0.040* 0.011 -0.001 0.002 
GRADDEG 0.034* 0.015 0.005 0.004 
STROKE 0.001 0.019 0.005 0.004 
CANCER -0.012 0.013 -0.0002 0.003 
N 16,258  16,258  
R2 0.114  0.129  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 29.  Correlation coefficients for whether the pneumonia or the Hepatitis B vaccine 
was received (preventative care proxy). 
 Pneumonia Vaccine Hepatitis B Vaccine 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE 0.017* 0.013 0.033* 0.016 
MEDICAID 0.042* 0.011 0.054* 0.014 
PRIVATE 0.030* 0.007 0.042* 0.009 
OTHER GOV’T INS 0.047** 0.024 0.093* 0.029 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
0.119* 0.019 0.202* 0.023 
INCLESS20k 0.014 0.010 -0.011 0.012 
INC. Between 20k-45k 0.029* 0.009 -0.006 0.010 
INC. Between 45k-75k 0.018* 0.009 -0.002 0.010 
MIDWEST 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.011 
SOUTH 0.005 0.008 -0.019* 0.010 
WEST 0.020* 0.009 -0.019 0.011 
FEMALE 0.009 0.005 0.064* 0.007 
BLACK -0.030* 0.007 0.029* 0.010 
HISPANIC -0.035* 0.008 -0.022 0.011 
ASIAN -0.036* 0.012 0.038* 0.018 
AGE2 0.00004* 0.000001 -0.000006 0.00001 
AGEPERCENT 0.041 0.089 -0.921* 0.126 
MARRIED -0.007* 0.006 -0.017* 0.008 
GOOD 0.037* 0.007 0.007 0.008 
FAIR 0.057* 0.010 0.014 0.013 
POOR 0.128* 0.019 0.021 0.022 
BORNUSA 0.023* 0.009 0.046* 0.011 
HSGRAD 0.032* 0.008 0.050* 0.012 
SOMECOL 0.046* 0.010 0.133* 0.013 
ASSOCBA 0.052* 0.010 0.174* 0.013 
GRADDEG 0.042* 0.014 0.243* 0.019 
STROKE 0.009 0.013 0.003 0.023 
CANCER 0.064* 0.011 0.009 0.015 
N 18,976  18,613  
R2 0.255  0.116  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
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Table 30.  Correlation coefficients for amount spent on health care and the private 
premium. 
 AMNTSPENTHC PRIVPREMIUM 
Variable Name Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
MEDICARE 0.051 0.034 -747.727 146.346 
MEDICAID -0.384* 0.031 162.678 409.570 
PRIVATE -0.014 0.021   
OTHER GOV’T INS -0.250* 0.061 535.027 1449.303 
MILITARY 
INSURANCE 
-0.287* 0.045 -486.034 274.533 
INCLESS20k -0.618* 0.029 -505.708 118.533 
INC. Between 20k-45k -0.310* 0.025 -532.268 84.276 
INC. Between 45k-75k -0.180* 0.025 -517.559 79.117 
MIDWEST 0.144* 0.026 -97.996 93.175 
SOUTH 0.157* 0.023 67.488 88.242 
WEST 0.097* 0.026 189.266 99.350 
FEMALE 0.106* 0.016 38.945 38.775 
BLACK -0.283* 0.023 -415.573 91.771 
HISPANIC -0.218* 0.027 --294.931 110.725 
ASIAN -0.267* 0.042 -5.400 160.602 
AGE2 -0.00004 0.00003 0.135 0.129 
AGEPERCENT 0.712* 0.276 2.975 1187.095 
MARRIED 0.350* 0.018 1082.704 65.966 
GOOD 0.207* 0.019 -68.898 70.475 
FAIR 0.410* 0.028 304.847 115.484 
POOR 0.643* 0.045 816.416 232.993 
BORNUSA 0.002 0.027 -50.295 108.060 
HSGRAD 0.028 0.024 83.587 108.582 
SOMECOL 0.139* 0.027 232.920 115.088 
ASSOCBA 0.142* 0.027 152.288 109.559 
GRADDEG 0.187 0.037 105.778 134.617 
STROKE 0.091* 0.049 -158.993 201.045 
CANCER 0.220* 0.032 114.616 110.725 
N 19,311  7521  
R2 0.154  0.081  
Data gathered from the NHIS 2006 
All regressions also controlled for geographic region, gender, race, age, marital status, birth in the United States, and 
education 
* indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level   
** indicates statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
 
 
